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Abstract 
In The Master and His Emissary, Iain McGilchrist proposes that an intrinsic aspect of 
human neurology has an undue influence on shaping culture and that this particular 
trait manifests itself in opposition to spirituality, art and the body. I examine these 
domains to find evidence for the cultural processes he warns of. I also draw on 
Lacanian theory, via the work of Slavoj Žižek, as a general template to map out the 
ideological landscape in which the features McGilchrist identifies are played out. I 
have limited the use of Lacanian theory so that there can be a space for the 
development of McGilchrist’s ideas.  
The thesis looks at aspects of culture that manifest this ideological process and 
focuses on the delivery of psycho-social healthcare as an exemplar of it, on how 
overt statements of beneficence are ideologically grounded. State delivery of 
psycho-social care ignores the assumptions on which its methods are founded. This 
thesis addresses that lack. Any attempt to promote a definitive solution to this 
situation could become yet another ideological structure that merely compounds the 
problem. I look for a solution in areas beyond the symbolic network utilised by an 
ideology, areas that correspond to the Lacanian Real. In the daily lived experience of 
a subject, this can also be translated as the esoteric.  
I explore concepts found in mystic traditions, whether religiously grounded or of a 
more secular nature. I conclude that their practical application becomes ideologically 
corrupted if they are overly prescriptive, but they do show the potential for individual 
subjects to prepare for the singular events that sometimes rupture the standing 
order. With suitable preparation, individuals stand a better chance of using such 
events to change their circumstances for the better.        
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You find yourself walking through a factory which at the time was the 
biggest factory I'd ever seen in my life. And it was machining plant for 
making engines. So the air is full of that peculiar mixture of machining fluid 
and fine metal grit. Walking down through this haze, and there's enough 
haze that you can't see the far end of the building that you're inside, and 
you're beginning to think 'what am I going to do in a place like this?'. But at 
the same time there was excitement because production processes and that 
many people working and machines going have a rhythm and a pace their 
own that sort of enters the blood (Sir Ian Gibson, Ford General Manager 
1979 to 1980 BBC Four 2009, 25:05-25:40). 
 
 
But for a lot of people it is just obvious that we are machines. Because we 
only understand something by comparing it with a model and what you 
compare it with determines what it is you find. If you compare something 
with a machine, all its machine-like properties will start to stand forth but 
everything else will recede. That makes you think this is a very good model 
and so you carry on using it and soon you can’t break out of this and you 
can’t see anything that that model doesn’t yield. And we have been sold this 
model that we are machines by clever people in the media and it’s become 
almost embarrassing to mention things like the soul. It might mean that you 
were half-educated, not very intelligent, easily impressed with superstition 
and not sharp or serious. And I want to suggest to you that the precise 
opposite is the case (Iain McGilchrist 2016, 12:40–13:40). 
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Introduction 
This thesis developed from my work as a psychotherapist and manager within the 
National Health Service (NHS) from 2008 to 2017. It is a response to the ideologies 
influencing those areas of health policy which are related to emotional wellbeing 
through the United Kingdom’s (UK) statutory health services. The first of the two 
projects I conducted as part of this (Hanson 2014a) showed the presence of the 
ideological processes themselves. The second project (Hanson 2015) looked at the 
way that a subjectivity built on different ideals interacted with a system that endorsed 
the ideology identified in the earlier project.   
 
My work has been based on the theory put forward by McGilchrist in The Master and 
His Emissary (2009) that traits associated with the natural functioning of the human 
brain’s left hemisphere, which have evolved to enable us to analyse and manipulate 
the world around us, also have a propensity to distort the ways in which people 
mutually interact with their cultures over time. McGilchrist’s book covers two main 
themes: the neurology of the brain hemispheres and the cultural influence that arises 
from this interaction. He proposes that when they are unchecked by the moderating 
effect of the right hemisphere, the left hemisphere traits have an undue influence 
which is reflected in deleterious effects upon people and their culture. A summary of 
his theory is at Appendix One. McGilchrist explores many cultural aspects but he 
does not include an overall sociological viewpoint from which to study the wider 
societal impact of his theory, and it is here that I turn to the work of Žižek, who writes 
extensively about ideology as well as many of the problems confronting societies 
today, such as subjectivity, capitalism, human migration and social exclusion. Like 
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McGilchrist, Žižek also uses numerous cultural references, especially film (1992), to 
illustrate his points.  
 
If McGilchrist’s theory is correct, there are implications not only for the interests of 
our society but also the way that a society’s problems are addressed through the 
delivery of healthcare services, particularly those related to psycho-social care: the 
same institutions designed to support those individuals who are negatively affected 
by societal difficulties. My thesis aims to discern the effects that McGilchrist warns us 
of and to suggest potential responses.  
 
Statutory wellbeing services are the officially sanctioned point at which the social 
body attempts to heal its difficulties. Under a liberal capitalist framework, providers 
have commercial relationships with the state to deliver wellbeing services through 
institutions such as the NHS. These services are the points at which the culture in 
distress might find some way of averting further problems and at which the 
government intervenes in the interior emotional life of a person. If this effort is based 
on incorrect assumptions about the problem being tackled, there are wide-scale 
policy implications in that the millions of pounds invested in trying to improve the 
emotional situation of many communities could be spent differently and better. 
McGilchrist (2009) warns us that the left hemisphere activities try to perpetuate their 
limited worldview once they begin to misperceive it as the only one that matters. If 
McGilchrist is correct, then the current system will try to persist in working 
inefficiently and possibly harmfully. 
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In this thesis I will address the following points: 
 What is the current problem with wellbeing services from a perspective based 
on McGilchrist’s theory? 
 Is there a way of articulating the left hemisphere functions so that they can be 
studied more easily? (Unless this is done, we are at risk of trying to analyse a 
problem through the analytical medium that is the problem itself.) 
 Can I find evidence for McGilchrist’s theory in modern cultural settings beyond 
healthcare? Is healthcare only one part of a wider problem? Does the 
ideological influence on domestic wellbeing services have implications beyond 
that particular setting? 
 How should we respond to the above matters?  
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Chapter 1: Introducing the Theoretical Approaches - McGilchrist’s 
Hemispheres and Žižek’s Lacan  
According to McGilchrist (2009), there is an optimum way for the human brain to 
manipulate the world around it. In general terms, the right hemisphere, which is more 
closely engaged with the surrounding environment, communicates its findings to the 
left hemisphere, which specialises in analysing fragmentary information. The 
important final step is for the left hemisphere to then pass its new knowledge back to 
the right hemisphere, which retains the more holistic view, to assist it in making 
judgements about how to interact with the world. But the left hemisphere tends to 
value its own narrow conclusions, based on limited information, above those of the 
right. This arrangement can go awry if the left hemisphere becomes less inclined to 
co-ordinate its work with that of the right. Given that the relationship between the two 
hemispheres is there to enable us to work with the world around us, McGilchrist 
contends that over time, human cultures can be negatively shaped by this 
imbalance. The metaphor behind The Master and His Emissary is that of a wise ruler 
who relies on an emissary because he cannot oversee his entire kingdom alone. The 
emissary, unaware that his duties encompass only a small part of larger system, 
begins to believe that he can rule in the master’s stead and usurps him with 
disastrous consequences. McGilchrist proposes that there have been epochs when 
this secondary process, that of the emissary, has had undue influence on the 
surrounding culture and that we appear to be in such an era now. This argument 
does not favour one brain hemisphere over another, it is instead about certain 
important mental functions running to excess. McGilchrist (2009) clarifies that it is not 
that one hemisphere thinks and the other feels, but it is that we must synthesise two 
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ways of thinking and two ways of feeling, with the caveat that all parts of the brain 
are utilised in some way with every activity. 
 
McGilchrist’s link between the neurological and the cultural is generalised through 
the idea of a feedback loop and the philosophical term Aufhebung (2009, p. 352), 
which he interprets to mean integration. McGilchrist describes cultural changes over 
time but does not provide a framework for understanding these beyond the 
interrelationship of neurology and cultural movements. This is the point where I 
employ Žižek to try to frame the ideological space in which this feedback loop 
occurs. My approach is to set McGilchrist’s theory in the wider context of Žižek’s 
world. Neither Žižek nor McGilchrist discuss each other - they operate in separate 
domains: the social and the neurological. But McGilchrist does briefly mention the 
influence of psychoanalytical thinking on culture (2009) and Žižek’s use of Lacanian 
theory, in relation to art and culture as well as to societal problems, can correspond 
with McGilchrist in those areas.  
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Chapter 2: The Problem - Current Antagonisms in Wellbeing 
According to Žižek (2006a), drawing on the work of Laclau and Mouffe (1985), 
ideologies arise as part of an attempt by a social system to conceal its inherent 
antagonisms. Based on this model, an ideology of wellbeing encourages the 
distressed individual to believe that the social structure around them is not a factor to 
consider in the formulation of their problems and urges them to change their thinking 
rather than to critique their surroundings. Wellbeing is an important area to examine 
because it is the point where the wider societal antagonisms attempt to heal 
problems that they are responsible for creating. The state delivery of psychological 
and social services is a useful juncture for observing ideological processes as well 
as being a potential point for intervention, for trying to ameliorate the effects that the 
ideology has upon the individual. I will be examining how a highly rational, utilitarian 
approach to healthcare – an approach that perceives itself to be capable of solving 
problems rather than causing them – actually contains inherent difficulties and is 
unaware of the part that it plays in creating the antagonisms around it.  
 
Under the statutory health services in the United Kingdom (UK), wellbeing, as an 
abstract idea that has been packaged under the mindset that McGilchrist warns us 
of, has been shaped by the introduction of IAPT (Improving Access to Psychological 
Therapy) mental health services which assume a certain form of subject. Cognitive 
behavioural therapy (CBT), as delivered under IAPT, is predicated on a predictable 
subject who receives standardised treatment in a neutral social setting; the evidence 
base for this is structured on the assumption that RCTs (Randomised Controlled 
Trials) are the gold-standard by which to judge a treatment's efficacy even though 
this method artificially excludes the countless variables which influence therapy, 
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such as the therapeutic relationship between therapist and patient (Rosenzweig 
1936), or the agency of each client in making therapy successful (Bohart and 
Tallman 1999). It is a pharmacological assessment tool overapplied to the field of 
psycho-social wellbeing where variables are far more complex (Bower and Gilbody 
2010).  
 
Scientific objectivity is not value neutral: "It is just one particular way of looking at 
things, a way which privileges detachment" (McGilchrist 2009, p. 28). Within the 
therapeutic relationship there may be factors that are not typically accounted for in 
mainstream research, qualitative information that can vary so much between 
research cohorts that it would be hard to capture. Some researchers have been able 
to provide outlines. Asay and Lambert (2004) isolated four factors common to all 
psychotherapy which play a role in whether the treatment will reach a successful 
outcome. Frank and Frank (1991) found the commonality of myth and ritual within 
both psychotherapy and traditional healing systems. Frankl’s (2004) personal 
account of the Holocaust gives us examples of people deriving meaning from their 
attitude towards their imminent death in the harshest of conditions. These are just 
some examples of the numerous possibilities of what might be the active ingredients 
of a successful psychotherapeutic intervention.  
 
State delivered psycho-social healthcare in the UK follows the guidance put forward 
by the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE). The NICE 
guidelines on mental health treatment (2009), following the medical model originally 
designed around physical health, focus on the declared treatment method rather 
than the therapist, as outlined in the examples above, the nature of which will have a 
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profound influence on the actual delivery of that model. In the style of the Académie 
Française, NICE is seeking to control a discourse but may be damaging what it aims 
to preserve by limiting adaptation. Aschoff (2015) claims that there is a storytelling 
elite who transmit a cultural message through media products such as the Oprah 
franchise, which encourages people to change themselves to adapt to the world 
rather than change the conditions under which they live.  
 
Sacks’ (2013) recollection that the change of case notes occurred in parallel with the 
promotion of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) is in 
keeping with McGilchrist’s expectations: that there would be a change from artful, 
descriptive single studies of how an individual was to briefer, formulaic summaries of 
what their problem was. These developments are similar to the changes tracked by 
Foucault (1994), where the relationship between the patient and their healer 
changes to one where the patient is seen as a site of illness and brought under the 
scrutiny of a medical gaze. The focus on the category of disease rather than the 
person can be linked to the encroachment of litigation into the field of mental health 
which has resulted in patients seeking a specific diagnosis so that damages owed to 
them can be more accurately assessed.  In an effort to regain this spirit, to move 
away from seeing the human as a collection of pathologies, Seligman (2000) has 
tried to generate a different model of treatment via Positive Psychology, which 
emphasises positive traits rather than symptoms. But this still requires belief in the 
idea of a client's problem being one of unhappiness. 
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Computerised CBT (cCBT) is the apogee of the ideological arrangement I have been 
describing: the human sits alone being given instructions by a computer program 
about their cognitions and behavior. This therapeutic intervention also exhibits the 
problematic left hemisphere characteristics in another way, in that the implications of 
its failure have been ignored: the research endorsing such methods, such as by 
Proudfoot et al. (2003) is conducted in such a rarified atmosphere that it gives too 
limited a picture of the processes involved in psychological treatment. In its 
application with real patients outside laboratory conditions, cCBT was found to be no 
more effective in the treatment of depression than usual GP care alone (Gilbody et 
al. 2015). The critics of cCBT conclude that the disparity between the research 
supporting this treatment and its failure in application is because research has been 
conducted in specialist centres by researchers who were in some way invested in 
the project’s success (Gilbody et al. 2015). But the presence of artificial conditions 
and an interest group also applies in the case of other clinical trials of psychological 
treatments. CBT is regarded as being particularly suited to obsessive-compulsive 
disorder, yet stress-reduction techniques produce effects that are nearly as 
beneficial for the client. Whittal et al. (2010), in comparing CBT with stress- 
management training, found that the latter was almost as effective but were unable 
to establish why. McGilchrist’s response to the lack of an answer would be that a left 
hemisphere mindset fails to look for answers outside itself. Research involving 270 
collaborators found that much psychological research failed reproducibility tests 
(AAAS 2015) from which it can be assumed that the standards used to claim 
therapeutic effectiveness have been corrupted. The learning to be taken from Žižek’s 
oeuvre is that in the symbolic economy, the undercurrent says the opposite of the 
surface message. Overtly, psychological treatment touts its objectivity, but beneath 
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this veneer is an understanding that a lot of partiality is required to achieve this 
apparent neutrality. The unwritten rule appears to be that one must pretend, that one 
acts as if one believes in order to maintain the façade. In Žižek’s (1989) Lacanian 
interpretation of ideology, this pretence is to protect the gaze of the big Other, that 
which upholds the symbolic order, from the failure of the system supporting it.   
 
The Socratic questioning of the fifth century BC, aimed at generating profound 
insights, was the sort of subversive activity which lead to Socrates’ death sentence: 
he had caused the Athenian society of his day to confront uncomfortable truths. Yet 
under IAPT, Socratic questioning has become relegated to a therapeutic tool, far 
detached from its socially disruptive potential. One of the more up-to-date books by a 
leading exponent of CBT (Drummond 2014) closes off the possibilities of Socratic 
enquiry from an examination into the nature of the surrounding social order which 
could be influencing a troubled individual. This leaves us with a template for 
sophistry, a runt of the original that is now used to deflect an individual away from 
critical enquiry.  The CBT form of Socratic questioning coerces the client into 
accepting consensus because it limits the questioning to the basics of how a 
patient’s beliefs about anxiety and depression might be preventing the CBT from 
reducing symptoms. The exercise is no longer an attempt to pursue truth or to 
generate an unfolding experience. In the hands of today's psychological hierarchy, 
Socratic questioning is a means to close off alternatives, in that issues beyond the 
psychological, subjects that Socrates would have pursued, are left unaddressed. 
Closing off extraneous information is something the left hemisphere excels at 
(McGilchrist 2009). An alternative dialogue about the sources of distress in modern 
society and the role of psychology in treating it is excluded.   
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IAPT services do help some people but the visibility of what is occurring within each 
session is limited to narrowly defined outcome measures by which the perceived 
effectiveness of the IAPT services themselves is monitored. Despite the intention 
behind RCTs to isolate the active ingredient in a model of therapy, there is no 
guarantee that the effects of the theory are actually having the predicted influence 
within the context of each session with all of the variables that might affect it 
(Wampold 2001). Reisner (2005) suggests that some therapies can be more 
effective for some disorders but acknowledges the strong effect of external factors. 
If, as I contend, society is developing along the lines that McGilchrist (2009) 
suspects it may, then the subtleties of the factors unique to each session, such as 
the therapeutic relationship, or the sheer weight of pressing external factors, such as 
a serious illness, will become increasingly ignored and therapy delivered by the state 
will be far less effective than it could be. It is also demeaning for the successful CBT 
therapists whose efforts are assumed to be effective through their adherence to 
doctrine rather than their own unique personal qualities such as their ability to build 
rapport with a patient.  
 
In summary, wellbeing services are delivered under a utilitarian programme based 
on data analysis and it ignores its potential deficiencies. The healthcare system is 
acting like an institution which is heavily influenced by the thinking process 
McGilchrist (2009) describes in an unchecked left hemisphere. Ideological processes 
will attempt to conceal these antagonisms (Žižek 2006a) and those within the system 
itself will try to thrive within it by exploiting any transgressions which the system 
allows.     
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Having explained the nature of the problem in terms of statutory delivery of services 
for psycho-social care, I will now look at the individual subjected to these influences.   
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Chapter 3: Subjectivity in Wellbeing 
Prior to Žižek becoming an established guide to Lacan’s work as a medium for the 
study of power, Lacan’s form of psychoanalytic theory had been applied to politics by 
figures such as Althusser (1971) as well as Laclau and Mouffe (1985). One of 
Žižek’s (2006a) applications of Lacanian theory is to interrogate ideologies at the 
point where they attempt to smooth over the antagonisms that are part of their 
essence; an idea that can also be applied to a clinical setting where ideologies 
influence health and social care delivered under the closed mindset that McGilchrist 
(2009) identifies. In its most obvious form, this concealment of antagonisms 
manifests as the causes of emotional distress and their treatment being over-
simplified so that they can be represented in a way that does not call into question 
the inequalities and disadvantages inherent in the way a society is structured.  
 
IAPT, as a form of Althusser’s (1971) Ideological State Apparatuses (ISAs), 
educates the subject into seeing the problems as a matter of their subjective thought 
and behavior rather than as a result of the failures of the system itself. The 
antagonisms driving their upset remain concealed and once declared fit, they take 
their place back in the structure.    
 
I will be using Žižek’s Lacanian ideas to look at the subject of these systems. The 
relationship between the subject and the forces intersecting them is complex. 
Sturrock describes the difficulty of attempting to use terminology, such as 
structuralism, that would easily categorise some of the key thinkers in this field:  
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To the query ‘Where does Foucault stand?’ there is no easy answer. 
Lacan is a man of famously arrogant independence who prefers others to 
follow and be influenced by him, rather than to appear himself to be 
following or even associating with others (Sturrock 1979, p. 4).   
 
Althusser’s (1971) theory of ISAs relies on a coherent subject who is hailed by the 
system and responds. According to Eagleton, Althusser misreads Lacan; 
“Althusser’s imaginary subject really corresponds to the Lacanian ego” (Eagleton 
2007, p. 144; italics in the original) resulting in a subject who is “a good deal more 
stable and coherent” (ibid.) than Lacan’s, for whom “the imaginary dimension of our 
being is punctured and traversed by insatiable desire, which suggests a subject 
rather more volatile and turbulent” (ibid.). The ambiguous and rebellious aspects of 
the subject’s relationship with their social order are unacknowledged by Althusser, 
who has produced instead an ideology of the ego, as far as Eagleton (2007) is 
concerned. Eagleton argues that if Althusser’s subject were as unstable as Lacan’s, 
interpellation would be less clear-cut. 
 
 Unlike the structuralism of Althusser, post-structuralism looks at factors such as 
power, language, social institutions and personal consciousness, areas beyond the 
relationship between capital and labour, meaning that the post-structuralist subject 
mentally adopts a subject position within a discourse (Weedon 1997). Butler (1997) 
sees Althusser as setting the stage for Foucault’s (1995, 1998) ideas of a 
discursively produced subject. McGilchrist does not use the same terminology of 
subjectivity but in providing reasons for the success of the left hemisphere’s thinking 
style in the West, he states that this intellectual characteristic bestows power, 
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provides simple explanations by omitting what contradicts its view, constructs 
arguments in its favour and that it has fashioned the world to suit itself (McGilchrist 
2012a). These are arguments that fit Foucault’s (1995, 1998) ideas of a discourse 
with the power to shape an individual and how they think.   
 
McGilchrist (2009) states that despite its shortcomings, the left hemisphere is vital for 
our capacity to make sense of the world around us. Lacan (2006) informs us that we 
would fall into psychosis without our inscription into the symbolic order. But 
submission to these structures does not have to be total.  
 
That we have to be interpellated as some kind of subject is clear: the 
alternative, for Lacan, would be to fall outside the symbolic order 
altogether into psychosis. But there is no reason why we should always 
accept society’s identification of us as this particular sort of subject 
(Eagleton 2007, p. 145; italics in the original).  
 
Even for those who reject Lacan’s version of an incomplete subject, it is possible to 
imagine a subject who may not be fully interpellated. In McGilchrist’s terms (2009), 
the left hemisphere is only dealing with part of the information to which the right 
hemisphere has access. The response of the subject hailed by the ISA may be 
misinterpreted (Dews 1987) or the validity of the interpellation may remain in 
question because the Lacanian subject is not fully present in their response 
(Eagleton 2007). The Lacanian perspective is that “no particular other can ever 
furnish me with the confirmation of my identity I seek, since my desire for such 
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confirmation will always ‘go beyond’ this figure” (Eagleton 2007, p. 145; italics in the 
original).   
 
For Althusser’s subject, the situation is pessimistic as there is no obvious means of 
escape (Eagleton 2007). But the different approaches to subject formation which I 
have described marry up at the level of the unconscious, where “the ground of all our 
insight, then, is some primordial opaqueness to ourselves” (Eagleton 2007, p. 177). 
The idea of the unconscious and unknown being a contested site and a possible 
space from which to respond to ideology will be explored later. Žižek (1989) sees the 
weak point in Althusser’s argument as the lack of explanation linking the external ISA 
to the internalised obedience of the individual. Žižek’s answer to this gap is that the 
ISA can exert its influence “only in so far as it is experienced, in the unconscious 
economy of the subject, as a traumatic, senseless injunction” (1989 p. 43).  I will be 
working with these ideas of self-opaqueness and of the divided subject. 
 
The practical effect of these ideologies in state provisioned healthcare is that the 
individual is guided into overlooking the possibility that the causes of their distress 
might be rooted in the same system that is claiming ownership of that person's 
wellbeing. The state’s IAPT project is a psychologically oriented programme whose 
narrow cognitive behaviourist interpretation of a patient’s symptoms belies the fact 
that many of the stressors for an individual can be seen as social phenomena which 
fall outside the remit of a psychologically driven intervention (Asay and Lambert 
2004). This can include factors such as housing, debt, relationships, employment 
and support.  
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The morality of IAPT is questionable, for its aim is to send people back into the 
conditions that generate the kind of problems that produced the distress in the 
individual in the first place. The successfully treated individual is expected to conform 
and there is a tacit acceptance that a new generation will in turn take up the baton of 
distress. This strategy is similar to an economic model for generating profit in a new 
product: the demand for services is maintained amid an illusion of activity. People 
are coached to see their problems in a certain way and their treatment is successful 
once they have changed their attitude in the prescribed manner. In Lacanian terms, 
this is perversity in that the collective members of society are failing to traverse the 
fantasy, failing to change their relationship to the big Other. They continue to obey 
what is not in their best interests. The system is either failing to see, or else ignoring, 
the wider context. It is fixated on delivering the treatment and recording the act as a 
metric to prove efficacy.  
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Chapter 4: Forming a Response 
 
4.1: McGilchrist in Žižek’s World 
I have described the effects of the processes in McGilchrist’s (2009) theory as well 
as some ideas on how Žižek’s Lacanianism (1989) can also be seen at work through 
the ideas of the divided subject, ideology and the big Other. McGilchrist provides the 
neurological basis for the thinking style that lies behind a fixed belief in ideological 
structures while Žižek can give us some understanding of how the consequences 
unfold in modern society. My proposed response cannot be overly prescriptive, lest it 
become the substance of what it is intended to be reacting against. McGilchrist 
(2009) emphasises how Heidegger’s (1996) aletheia (unconcealing) presupposes a 
truth awaiting revelation, rather than something constructed. It is an 
acknowledgement that there is something within Being that is hidden and that the 
process of revelation involves something else becoming elusive. My response to the 
ideologies within healthcare is to acknowledge what is concealed - the esoteric - on 
the understanding that by its nature it will not be explicit and will point the way to 
further concealment. The esoteric stands for what the left hemisphere thinking style 
cannot comprehend and for what the health services miss among the metrics which 
they use to gauge humanity. It is the aspect of the subject which escapes being fully 
known by the system or the subjects themselves. 
 
4.2: Theory and Practice  
Within the limits of responding to ideology from within it, I can generate debate about 
what I think is being observed but without being able to fully grasp it, let alone show 
something complete or fully reproducible. The mercurial nature of ideology and its 
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interaction with the psyche means that we can look at certain areas that we think we 
should watch on the understanding that what we believe that we are looking for may 
not appear, or may even elude us by surfacing elsewhere. 
 
McGilchrist (2009) describes the conditions created by the over-zealous left 
hemisphere mindset as being like trapped in a hall of mirrors because perception 
becomes so distorted that people are blind to what is occurring and unable to see a 
way out. For Žižek (1989), ideology shapes our reality so that we cannot see it 
because it is the everyday fabric of our lives. This presents the question of how the 
problems described by McGilchrist and Žižek can be investigated through theory and 
challenged in practice. In basing my work on their theories, I am presented with the 
same impasses as faced by McGilchrist and Žižek. McGilchrist (2009) suggests that 
there are pockets within cultures that retain their creative potential for when 
conditions become favourable again and that different approaches will eventually 
emerge in future as they have done so before. McGilchrist offers hope but does not 
advocate a specific strategy based on some form of direct action. Žižek (2011a) is 
cautious about actions inspired by a popular cause because the activity itself can 
take precedence over questions of its efficacy or consequences. Using the example 
of humanitarian aid, Žižek summarises the problematic attitude as follows: “Don’t 
think, don’t politicize, forget about the true causes of their poverty, just act, contribute 
money, so that you will not have to think!” (2011a, p. 4). Žižek emphasises the 
importance of theory over action in correcting this problem: “Maybe today we should 
say, ‘In the twentieth century, we maybe tried to change the world too quickly. The 
time is [here] to interpret it again, to start thinking’” (Žižek 2012a, 4:29–4:39).  
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I am using a theory-led approach to avoid adding to difficulties at a time when the 
problem I am looking at needs to be reformulated. My approach is to step back from 
what is already occurring in order to see if there is a completely different way to view 
the problem. The work of the two authors that I am drawing on is suited to a 
theoretical approach. For Žižek, there is a psychoanalytic orientation to his 
observations – he tries to see the hidden influences behind situations. For 
McGilchrist, the starting point is neurological, although he too comments on society 
and culture from a perspective that does not lend itself easily to standard empirical 
methods. For both authors, the motivations they describe are subtle and the effects 
can be hard to determine. They are both concerned with acquiring indirect 
knowledge about the relationship between the inner self and intangibles of society 
such as power or culture.  
 
I am taking McGilchrist’s (2009) ideas and attempting to understand their application 
in other areas. In doing so, I may be extending the search for evidence too far or 
inappropriately. I cannot offer definitive proof so there is the danger of me seeing 
something that is not there. McGilchrist (2009) states that the left hemisphere utilises 
a mode of coded language that implies the presence of factors which are not actually 
there, playing on the vanity of investigators by making them believe that they have 
uncovered something. My response to this is that what I am describing is never 
going to declare itself overtly - it can only be alluded to - but potential sites must still 
be examined. McGilchrist (2009) speaks of the problems encountered when making 
explicit that which was hidden: it is uncomfortable and hard to discern, easy for a 
dogmatist to sweep it away as unprovable by empirical means. 
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My argument against the problems inherent to the psycho-social care system is 
developed in terms that exceed the limits of that system. The idea is to permit 
uncertainty and open-endedness so that the research does not ossify around a fixed 
idea (Parker and Pavon-Cuellar 2014). I believe that the system which is at the heart 
of the problems I am describing remains too powerful to move against directly. None 
of my proposals would be countenanced by the current healthcare regimes. 
Improving practice may be a goal of research but this can be influenced by aspects 
such as whose practice it is aimed at (the management of practitioners or the 
management of information), the audience for the research (academic or industrial), 
and the preferences and skills of the researcher, as well as practicalities like time 
and money (Jones 2009). I am not rejecting a practical response to the current 
situation, but I am advocating that the problem be viewed differently before the next 
round of activity ensues. I have already criticised IAPT and I do not want to recreate 
it anew. As Žižek states: “I think the task of people like me is not to provide answers 
but to ask the right questions” (Aitkenhead 2012, unpaginated).   
 
The reasoning above is also behind my decision not to base my study on 
quantitative data about wellbeing from within the NHS. The data collected is already 
a part of the same problem in that it is designed to monitor the factors which the 
system already deems important. For example, it is used to make sure that the NHS 
Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs) are meeting targets for the number of 
patients seen (National IAPT Programme Team 2012) and by emphasising the scale 
of the activity over the precise nature of what is actually being delivered, data is used 
to conceal the problems within the organisation. This is the point where the idea of 
research as open theoretical enquiry can become co-opted, as knowledge 
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production designed around a government agenda or linked to commerce, as 
Gibbons et al. (1994) foresaw. The thinking behind the data collection is itself 
illustrative of the processes that are of concern to McGilchrist and Žižek and needs 
to be questioned from outside.  
 
Although there is a limit to how much practical influence can be wielded against the 
current healthcare system, this does not negate the pursuit of new ways of 
developing theory about the situation. In cases of power imbalance, research in the 
tradition of critical theorists can be a precursor to political change, achieving 
emancipatory activity by exposing injustices (Kincheloe and McLaren 2005). Even 
without a definitive response, research that questions accepted arrangements can 
be “styled ‘practical’ because of the crucial importance to human beings of securing 
and developing mutual understanding in the everyday conduct of life” (Crotty 2015, 
p.143).  
 
In terms of doctoral studies contributing to knowledge, theory is necessary to make 
meaning of the research and establish the significance of the new knowledge, which 
may derive from its breadth, how it helps to make sense of the world or its disruption 
of accepted ways of thinking (Thomson and Walker 2010). But the end result of the 
research may not achieve these ambitions and so “more humble definitions of 
contribution are required - a new voice in the conversation, a different angle and 
slant on something” (Thomson and Walker 2010, p. 393). For researchers trying to 
gauge the balance between theory and practice, national policy can direct research 
and control funding to projects that will deliver an impact on the social, economic or 
knowledge production fields. The consequence is that knowledge can be seen as 
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something produced in a particular place and then transferred into another setting. 
The concepts of impact and transfer then dominate academic research (Thomson 
and Walker 2010) and this is the type of pattern that has driven the problems that I 
am aiming to address in this thesis. I believe that research which revisits the 
theoretical bases behind the current problems carries the potential to deliver 
something new.  
 
A preference for theory-led research can exist in certain areas but there may be 
difficulties with how theory is understood and accounted for. In architecture, one 
study found that theory-based dissertations constituted a majority in Finland but also 
that the academic field needed to “consolidate the position of doctoral dissertations 
arising from the theoretical bases” (Aura, Katainen and Suoranta 2002, p. 78). 
According to another study on the place of theory in doctoral dissertations: 
 
the place of theory in research can intimidate some candidates initially 
because it points to a way of thinking that is difﬁcult to grasp without fuller 
immersion in a ﬁeld. The role of theory has also proved difﬁcult to 
articulate in general texts outside of reference to literature and to some 
extent this is echoed in examination (Holbrook, Bourke and Fairbairn 
2015, p. 83).  
 
Jones’ (2009) experience of a doctoral dissertation based entirely on grounded 
theory was of having to educate and influence others about the approach after 
finding that it was the only acceptable methodology. Despite challenges with 
weighting the research towards theory, doctoral theses based on theory can aspire 
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to wide-scale influence. Bettcher’s thesis is a psychoanalytic study of politics, which 
he describes as “an attempt to produce a political theory which relates to ‘real’ world 
affairs” (1997, p. 272).  
 
In their review of different definitions about theory when used in doctoral research, 
Gulson and Parkes (2010) believe that the role of explanation is a common theme 
but with the caveats that theory for doctoral research can be presented as something 
to be tested or as a conclusion to reached. Gulson and Parkes (2010) draw a 
distinction between explanation and understanding: the former, preferred by the 
natural sciences, aims to clarify through empirical evidence and data while the latter, 
preferred by the human sciences, seeks to articulate meaning and is more 
subjective. When used interpretatively, theory acts as “a disruptive force, 
deconstructive tactic, a denaturalising strategy, or a diffractive lens through which to 
view afresh a particular set of problems, or to problematise a phenomena [sic], text, 
or event that is usually taken-for-granted” (Gulson and Parkes 2010, p. 78). This is 
the sort of reformulation of the problem advocated by Žižek (2012a).  
 
Ogunnaike (2015) bases his dissertation on a comparison of intellectual traditions, 
including Sufism, traditional African systems and Western models, to find out ways of 
being and knowing. Beyond ideas of balancing theory and practice, Ogunnaike feels 
it is important to make a distinction between standard academic use of theory and 
theoria; the inner dimension as experienced by those who live according to the 
approaches he looked at.   
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In following on from Žižek’s call to think more before acting (Aitkenhead 2012), the 
works on which I am basing this thesis, those of McGilchrist and Žižek, are ones that 
discuss the importance of what is occurring within a person and how that person 
makes meaning of their world. A theory-based approach is the frame for how I 
perceive the problem and my place in understanding it. I see the effects that 
McGilchrist (2009) describes and I see them emerge in a world for which Žižek 
(1989) has explanations. In the next chapter, I will look at how Tweedy’s (2012) 
application of William Blake’s creativity gives me some way of articulating this 
situation. For these authors, who emphasise the importance of what is happening 
within a person, a theory-led approach privileges the interior life at a time when 
healthcare focuses on external data. Gulson and Parkes conclude that  
 
theory works on the doctoral student so they become recognisable as a 
particular sort of scholar, with a particular set of commitments. Theory 
isn’t simply adopted and applied. In the act of mobilising theory we are 
also adopted by the theory, as another of its conduits into discourse 
(2010, p. 82). 
 
4.3: Urizen 
Later, I will be looking for evidence of McGilchrist’s theory but before doing so, I will 
use this chapter to introduce the concept of Urizen, a figure from the work of William 
Blake which I am employing as a device to better encapsulate the interface between 
McGilchrist’s neurological theory and the culture it shapes. Urizen, one of the Four 
Zoas in Bake’s worldview, is an aspect of the human mind:  
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Blake’s exploration of the Four Zoas and their Emanations, for example, 
present us with a complex and vital dynamic within the human psyche, 
and indeed both Blake’s visual art and his written work revolve around 
these inner psychodynamics (Tweedy 2013, p 1). 
 
Tweedy (2012) links the mental faculty of Urizen portrayed by Blake and the left 
hemisphere traits described by McGilchrist (2009). Tweedy (2012) also sees a 
connection between the left hemisphere’s tendency to falsify (McGilchrist 2009) and 
Lacan’s view of an ego compelled towards misunderstanding and misrecognition, 
something to which spiritual beliefs are not immune: “We are one with God only 
when God is no longer one with Himself, but abandons Himself, ‘internalizes’ the 
radical distance which separates us from Him” (Žižek 2003a, p. 91)  
 
At some point, as we extend McGilchrist’s ideas into their practical effects on our 
world, it is helpful to find a modus operandi beyond neurological terms. Tweedy 
(2012), not only emphasised McGilchrist’s references to the artist and mystic William 
Blake, especially through Blake’s (1797) creation of the figure of Urizen, but also 
found correspondence between Blake’s critique of the culture of his time and 
McGilchrist’s theories. Blake’s Urizen is a figure that self-differentiated from the 
Eternity within which it developed: “Self-closed, all-repelling. What demon hath 
formed this abominable void, this soul-shuddering vacuum?” (Blake 2007, p. 255). 
Urizen is a useful way to conceptualise, beyond mere brain matter, the effects that 
McGilchrist (2009) describes. Urizen “symbolizes Reason. But he is much more than 
what we commonly understand by ‘reason’: he is the limiter of Energy, the law-
maker, and the avenging conscience” (Damon 1988, p. 419). Authors such as 
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Bracher (1985) and Freeman (1997) have used the figure of Urizen in a similar way 
to me. The physicist Frank Wilczek (2015), in his blending of the rational with the 
mystical, describes Blake’s figure of Urizen as dualistic: a figure who brings and 
constrains life. Wilczek sees Urizen as carrying echoes of Blake’s portrayal of 
Newton, a figure who achieved much but who in doing so became absorbed by 
abstractions and ignored a wider perspective. 
 
I do not wish to generate a debate over whether something is Urizenic or not: to 
divide the world in that way is the very tendency under discussion. My use of the 
image is designed to convey a theme and to use the idea of a figure inspired by 
Blake as a way of describing the world through metaphor and by permitting some 
ambiguity - terms that defy the precise language favoured by the brain’s left 
hemisphere (McGilchrist 2009). Figurative language provides some form of opening; 
a reader can paint Urizen in various shades depending on the setting. McGilchrist’s 
observations on language (2009) show that at different eras and in different cultures 
there have been some forms of written language which permitted ambiguity, which 
allowed for a play of meaning and in doing so they invited the reader to meet the 
author halfway without being explicitly instructed on what to think. 
 
In the following chapter, as I look for evidence for McGilchrist’s theory, I will use the 
figure of Urizen to describe the left hemisphere faculties when manifested in areas 
where they are more apparent. Urizen does not just refer to the neurological in 
McGilchrist’s theory, but it also helps to bridge the gap between the left hemisphere 
and the culture it influences. Urizen also helps to provide a metaphor for the points of 
commonality between the situations that McGilchrist and Žižek depict. 
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Chapter 5: Finding Evidence for McGilchrist’s ideas 
Urizen is not going to reveal itself through normal empirical studies. Both McGilchrist 
and Žižek are tackling issues that are deeply entrenched within our social fabric and 
from which it is hard to achieve some critical distance.    
  
 
5.1: Accounts Which Support McGilchrist  
 
Using Urizen’s preferred tools against it, there is some empirical evidence from other 
researchers for McGilchrist’s (2009) ideas. Tweedy (2012) makes much use of the 
personal account of Jill Bolte Taylor, a neuroscientist who suffered a left hemisphere 
stroke and found that it dramatically altered not only her cognitive functions but her 
attitudes, in line with McGilchrist’s predictions (Bolte Taylor 2009). Silani et al. (2013) 
found that the brain is dependent on a part of its right hemisphere to monitor and 
curb its own egocentric behavior. The human tendency to assess other people’s 
mental states by using the self as a reference point when applied in inappropriate 
situations can result in egocentrically biased judgements, and overcoming biased 
empathic judgements is associated with increased activation in the right 
hemisphere’s supramarginal gyrus, an area Silani et al. (2013) concluded was 
crucial in countering egocentricity. These examples are listed to illustrate the 
problem. To reiterate, the ultimate aim is collaboration between hemispheres, not a 
favouring of the right over the left hemisphere. The difficulty is that the left 
hemisphere processes that McGilchrist describes do not tolerate ambiguity and, at 
the most extreme level, as demonstrated in split-brain studies, do not recognise the 
existence of factors which do not conform to their limited view (Berlucchi, Mangun 
and Gazzaniga 1997). 
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Looking for traces of Urizen requires a holistic approach, to view the whole without 
solely engaging the left hemisphere functions of parsing and analysing. McGilchrist 
(2009) states that the left hemisphere acts gauchely when it tries to operate with 
authority in the domain of the right hemisphere (i.e. that of holism, empathy and 
ambiguity) and its associated cultural activity, such as the arts. McGilchrist indicates 
three areas which are a problem for the left hemisphere: “these points of weakness 
in the self-enclosed system are three rather important, indissolubly interlinked, 
aspects of human existence: the body, the soul and art (which relies on body and 
soul coming together)” (2009, p. 438). McGilchrist also describes the importance of 
context and abstraction. The left hemisphere takes information away from its original 
context to analyse it and interprets what it finds by abstraction, by transforming it in 
some way to make it more manageable. The left hemisphere should then pass that 
analysed material back to the right hemisphere so that it can be placed within the 
wider context, the broader worldview that is the bailiwick of the right. If left 
hemisphere tropes are detached from this final stage of the process, if they are 
regarding the analysed material as a complete picture rather than as a part, then the 
overall meaning behind that information can be radically altered through excessive 
abstraction and misplaced context (McGilchrist 2009). I will examine the left 
hemisphere’s three problematic areas in the order of art, body and soul. These areas 
not only inform us about McGiclhrist’s ideas, but they also have a role in the 
formation of ideology and responses to it. Sigurdson’s (2012) study of theology and 
ideology through the work of Žižek and Eagleton acknowledges the idea that 
humans flourish and have a sense of morality through mutual recognition of 
embodiment and that the embodiment itself is mediated by culture. Sigurdson adds 
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that embodiment “implies sociality, in that it suggests that the human subject is 
constituted by dependency rather than self-sufficiency” (2012, p. 38). In the following 
examples there will be indications of how Urizen promotes self-sufficiency over inter-
dependence through culture and embodiment.      
 
5.2: Art 
Huizinga described how a ludic attitude, including art, helped to shape culture but 
became separated from institutions once a “sacred seriousness” (1971, p. 31) arose. 
Pfaller’s (2014) interpretation of Huizinga - that this sphere of play and its loss is 
more of a psychic state rather than rules-based - brings the issue of cultural change 
through psychic influence close to the work of McGilchrist (2009) and Tweedy 
(2012).  
 
Artistic works rendered mechanically and prescriptively can become markers for the 
mode of thought that McGilchrist is concerned about. McGilchrist dedicates the 
second half of The Master and His Emissary to “many examples of the left 
hemisphere’s intemperate attacks on nature, art, religion and the body, the main 
routes to something beyond its power” (2009, p. 230).  
 
In his study of Proust’s Search for Lost Time, Deleuze states that 
 
it is by the work of art, by painting and music and especially by the 
problem of literature, that the hero of the Search arrives at this revelation 
of essences. The worldly signs, the signs of love, even the sensuous 
signs are incapable of giving us the essence; they bring us closer to it, but 
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we always fall back into the trap of the object, into the snare of 
subjectivity. It is only on the level of art that the essences are revealed. 
But once they are manifested in the work of art, they react upon all the 
other realms; we learn that they already incarnated, that they were 
already there in all these kinds of signs, in all the types of apprenticeship 
(2008, p. 25, italics in original).    
 
Writing on the subject of so-called Entartete Kunst (Degenerate Art) Mitchell (2010) 
describes how Barlach's unfinished forms were disliked by the Nazis because they 
wanted completeness. In the present day it appears that funding for innovative 
programmes within the domains of art or wellbeing requires a similar conformity from 
applicants. Current trends demand explanation over observation; a product has to 
exist at the end of the funded process, what McGilchrist (2009) describes as an 
emphasis on the what rather than the how. Zeki describes how the ambiguities that 
are an inherent component of art forms are derived from the way that our brains are 
structured to gather knowledge:  
 
Hence the capacity to give multiple interpretations is not a separate 
faculty invented or used by the artist. It is instead tied to a general 
capacity of the brain to give several interpretations, to instill meaning by 
applying several concepts, a capacity that is important for it in its role of 
acquiring knowledge. It is on this physiological basis that the prized quality 
of ambiguity in art is built (2009, p. 91). 
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In the field of art, an area where we can observe Urizen more easily, there appears 
to be a decline in in-depth knowledge among experts. Brian Allen, a trustee of the 
National Portrait Gallery, laments what he sees as a decline in connoisseurship in 
the education of art historians compared to "the rigours of older art, where you have 
to know languages, classical mythology, Greek and Roman history" (Alberge 2015, 
unpaginated). He is describing the importance of multiple forms of learning and the 
way that certain elements which might otherwise have been regarded as useful as 
one aspect of a multi-disciplinary approach, have been given elevated importance. 
McLuhan (2001) likened art to a radar system that could help people prepare for 
changes to their culture.  This lack of understanding and variety matches 
McGilchrist’s theory: the left hemisphere prefers novelty and narrowness.  
 
There is also a confluence of regimes within healthcare and art if we briefly compare 
Lord Richard Layard's takeover of healthcare with Sir Nicholas Serota's directing of 
contemporary art. I regard economist-turned-health-advisor Layard and professional 
art bureaucrat Serota as similar entities. Serota has privileged the practice of artistic 
abstraction, just as Layard has abstracted the art of psychotherapy. As an informer 
of social meaning, art has been transformed. The misplaced certainty of art co-opted 
by Urizen as a devourer is summed up in the widely publicised image showing 
Charles Saatchi grasping Nigella Lawson's throat (Toomey 2014). Saatchi provided 
the advertising for Thatcher’s 1979 election victory and invested heavily in Serota’s 
protégés although he and Serota later fell out.  
 
Larry Gagosian, the New York superdealer, whose global empire now has 
two London branches, considers Serota a master strategist. “Nick really 
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caught the wave,” Gagosian told me. “He saw the possibilities, the wealth 
coming in, and he kind of harnessed that” (Tomkins 2012, unpaginated).  
 
This strategy is similar to Layard’s coup in promoting one form of therapy and 
directing funds for its continuance. Serota and Layard extended their influence into 
the political realm, an arena where the left hemisphere can exercise its “desire for 
power and control” (McGilchrist 2009, p. 433). Serota’s management style resembles 
the Lacanian superego. Tomkins provides the following observation from one of 
Serota’s team:  
 
Nick was very focussed and very ambitious,” she said. “He was also very 
clever at getting the best out of his team, by being consciously 
counterintuitive. He’d throw out a provocative statement, and then reverse 
one hundred eighty degrees and throw out another one. He nurtured and 
encouraged critical thinking, and of course he was totally in control 
(Tomkins 2012, unpaginated).  
 
It is counterintuitive that he apparently encouraged critical thinking yet remained in 
control. 
 
There are other indications of the left hemisphere style in the world that Serota 
created. When some of the key players behind Tate Modern were interviewed in 
2016, they referred to wanting art to be exciting, to the sheer size of the gallery 
space and to the subsequent enormity of the installations when compared to normal 
human parameters (BBC Radio Four 2016). This attitude was neatly summarised by 
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the editor of the Independent on Sunday at that time, Janet Street-Porter: “the 
hugeness of it is going to excite people beyond the art” (BBC Radio Four 2016, 
25:20–25:26). In an earlier project (Hanson 2014a), I described the way in which 
Urizenic trends utilise the gigantic.  
 
The works by Robert Montgomery, a conceptual artist specialising in the use of text, 
include statements presented in large letters in different settings, sometimes 
describing a scene or an emotion with words. When asked why he uses words as a 
medium, Montgomery replies: 
 
I think there’s a certain slowness to words. I think we probably live in an 
age of accelerated image and we’re bombarded with, like, hundreds of 
images a day. Ironically in that context, words can be a sort of moment of 
quiet or a moment of pause (BBC Four 2016 27:10-27:26).  
 
In his reply, he has described the left hemisphere’s concern at having to deal with a 
flow of images and its response by deadening the flow so that analysis can occur. 
Body marking, an area that I shall examine shortly, is present here too. One of his 
most iconic works, titled People You Love (which consists of the text: The people 
you love become ghosts inside of you and like this you keep them alive displayed in 
large illuminated letters on public display) was written as an expression of grief for a 
deceased friend and has now become a popular tattoo. To take the abstraction even 
further, it has also been tattooed as a soundwave of the spoken words (BBC Four 
2016, 29:20–29:30). 
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Montgomery also says something that implies a need to maintain distance: 
 
The point of art is to touch the heart of strangers without the trouble of 
ever having to meet them. But if you can, sort of, touch their hearts from a 
distance and help a little bit, you know, from your quiet, sort of, studio then 
it’s quite nice (BBC Four 2016, 29:37-29:51). 
   
The point of this example is that it shows left hemisphere tropes emerging into 
contemporary culture in a subtle way. Montgomery wishes to share his emotional 
experiences in a compassionate way with other people and hopes to help them. Yet 
even here, the left hemisphere can insinuate itself.      
 
Urizen exposes itself through outlets such as art because its involvement in 
something that the left hemisphere regards as subversive (McGilchrist 2009) 
becomes tainted with its worldview: it abstracts something beyond recognition and 
treats it as an object to be manipulated. In his critique of the cult that Serota created, 
Massow also describes the left hemisphere process of abstraction to the point where 
understanding and coherence become lost:   
 
The boundaries have been pushed further and further ever since, but, I 
wonder, isn't it all now rather piss-poor compared to the brilliant and 
explosive interventions of our modernist forebears? Have we now gone so 
far in the other direction that, rather than just developing and broadening 
the contemporary arts scene, concept art has grown, like a virus, into little 
more than the dotcom of the art world? … Concept art is so firmly 
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‘established’, it is no longer promoted through reference to any criteria of 
aesthetics, originality or intellectual challenge, but through spin and the 
clever exploitation of the fear of ‘missing out’ (Massow 2002, 
unpaginated). 
 
5.3: Body 
The second of the three areas McGilchrist identifies is the body. I will be describing 
the influence of Urizen at the meeting point between art and the body through the 
medium of tattooing, recalling that McGilchrist (2009) sees art as the confluence of 
the body and soul. I am not referring to all tattoos or to tattooing as a practice; the 
tattoos of concern to me are those that are a close approximation to the conceptual 
art I have discussed above. Urizen’s influence in the art gallery extends onto human 
skin. There comes a point in body art where the disparateness of the themes begins 
to resemble McGilchrist’s examples of the left hemisphere’s perception of the world, 
in that fragments of information are isolated from their source and heavily abstracted 
from their original meaning. Benson describes this interaction between body art, 
culture and the psyche: 
 
The haphazard and incoherent nature of early twentieth-century tattoo 
reflects lives that were themselves often incoherent and fragmented, ‘one 
thing after another’: we should not be surprised by the absence of a 
master narrative of the self expressed upon the skin (2000, p. 245). 
 
There has been an increase in tattooing although little is known about its prevalence 
and characteristics amongst the general adult population and what research there is 
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tends to focus on adolescents and prisoners (Heywood et al. 2012). Grumet (1983) 
saw the tattoo as a part of a person’s self-construction of their identity. He adds that 
“further evidence for a sociopathic diagnosis is found in a hodgepodge of unrelated 
and asymmetrical designs which have been termed ‘kitsch’ tattoos” (1983 p. 490).  
 
There are a variety of reasons why people get tattooed (Wohlrab, Stahl and 
Kappeler 2007) and their motivations are further complicated by the influence of 
mainstream and social media on their decision (Walzer and Sanjurjo 2016). 
Historically, tattoos would have played a valuable role in social cohesion as part of 
an overall pattern of cultural practices shared by a large body of people. The history 
of tattooing practices in Europe and America is complex and is in its very early 
stages of research (Benson 2000). But, as with the example of conceptual art, there 
are influences on art displayed on the body which reflect negative aspects of modern 
living:    
 
Our current society craves individuality and self expression. And now 
many people wear their artistic expression. We are having more trouble 
communicating with each other than ever before, as electronic 
communication will never replace face-to-face human contact. So, it’s not 
surprising that there’s a growing trend toward communication via body ink. 
We don’t have to talk, we just have to look. Our bodies have become the 
refrigerator magnets of quotes, sayings and reminders (Karim 2013). 
 
I see this form of body art as a way in which people can signify to one another in the 
same way that Deleuze (2008) described in his study of the work of Marcel Proust, 
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who portrayed individuals signifying to one another to illustrate that it is possible that 
someone “‘communicates’ nothing to us, but unceasingly produces signs that must 
be deciphered” (Deleuze 2008, p. 25). 
 
I am indicating the popularity of these designs as the footprints of Urizen, for the left 
hemisphere constructs its own self-image in spite of the facts (McGilchrist 2009). 
Dawkins’ (1976) concept of the meme as a unit of culture is Urizenic and has 
relevance here. McGilchrist describes this operation as “a perfect example, 
incidentally, of the left hemisphere’s way of construing its own history, not least in its 
way of breaking a culture into atomistic fragments devoid of context” (2009, p. 247). 
The fragmentation of images is a theme of left hemisphere influence (McGilchrist 
2009).   
 
The individual relies on signifiers to provide some semblance of meaning to their 
world. Without these signifiers, the individuals would fall into a state of psychosis, 
unable to fix meaning to their surroundings (Lacan 2006). The signifiers shore up 
meaning through reference to other signifiers although some carry greater influence 
than others: “all signs are equal, but some are more equal than others” (Chandler 
2001, p. 111). These nodes that set the tone for others are what Lacan (2006) 
termed points de capiton (quilting points). They are more stable, less likely to change 
suddenly and exert greater influence over other signifiers. Even the quilting points 
are contested sites and their meanings can change. Chandler (2001) advises that 
studies of semiotics should note what is not represented in the signs, that which is 
hidden but which may leak through. I believe that this leakage can be seen in body 
art, two sites where Urizen is more likely to expose itself because of its desire to 
46 
 
control these areas but also its limited capacity to do so without altering what it finds 
there. McGilchrist (2009) contends that art in the West has been increasingly 
influenced by the left hemisphere and Urizen’s visibility on the body is consistent with 
this view.  
 
Sometimes signification through tattooing in the modern era has practical value. For 
example, within the vast and disorientating network that was the penal system of the 
former Soviet Union it was necessary for a person to signify their status and other 
information about their role in the criminal (vor) culture by the use of specific 
symbolic tattoos, a code that one would not violate lightly (Lambert 2001).  
 
Harvey (2000) predicted a postmodern society lacking a sweeping narrative. Pfaller 
states that postmodernism overstates its scepticism, creating “the same ego-fixated 
enjoyment of those who believe in everything that they believe in, regardless of what 
it is, only in order to believe in themselves” (2014, Loc. 223). There are occasions 
when single, symbolic tattoos generated from current ideas can be highly 
meaningful; one example is the use of the semicolon design as a preventative 
against suicidal thoughts (BBC News 2015a). But it too, within a few months, has 
become a design that is becoming detached from its original purpose, as this extract 
from an interview with tattoo artists makes clear:  
 
Why do people keep getting the same tattoos? 
It's literally Instagram and Pinterest. Everyone's getting Instagram tattoos. 
You go on Pinterest and everyone has the same tattoo; infinity symbols 
and those bloody semi-colons. It's almost like a joke now in the trade  
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(Kale 2015, unpaginated). 
 
To reiterate, I am not arguing against tattooing itself – it is a practice with a long 
cultural history. But I am arguing that the same Urizenic features found in conceptual 
art have also influenced modern tattooing trends and that this is occurring at the 
convergence of two areas, the art and the body, which McGilchrist has indicated as 
significant with regard to the left hemisphere. Tattoos might be regarded as making a 
statement, but using art to do so “is itself another aspect of left hemisphere 
domination” (McGilchrist 2009, p. 414). Even statements made in this way can 
articulate an unintended message, as Farrell observes in differentiating modern 
tattoos from those used in ancient cultures:   
 
What’s striking about threatening tattoos is how equivocal they are. 
They’re frightening signs of real conflicts, yet also just playful abstractions. 
They wink and snarl at the same time. They make a passive aggressive 
protest rather than openly defy injustice and abuse. This may be a logical 
reaction in an era when people feel haunted by a sense of oppression 
whose sources are masked and too big to confront (Farrell 2013, 
unpaginated). 
 
Urizen is finding another medium through which to signify but revealing more about 
the situation it creates than it intends. Benson (2000) acknowledges the therapeutic 
or emancipatory claims of tattoo enthusiasts but observes that the decorations 
themselves represent little more than changes in aesthetic taste. Benson also sees 
this “self-fashioning” as confirming “much of what is currently written by cultural 
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critics about the plasticity, contingency and motility of identities in the world of ‘late 
capitalism’” (2000, p. 236) – views that echo Žižek’s (2003a, 2006a) misgivings 
about New Age thinking which I will discuss further in Chapter 7.6. But Benson’s 
study also corresponds with McGilchrist in that she sees body marking as an attempt 
to fix and control the sense of self, seeing the body as manifesting the subject’s will. 
In contemporary body marking, control is exercised through “the body as a thing to 
be bent to the will of the self” (Benson 2000, p. 250) and tattooing gives “assertions 
of permanence to ideas of the body as property and possession,” (Benson 2000, p. 
251). The left hemisphere baulks at its inability to control the impermanence of the 
body (McGilchrist 2009). Blake, in developing the figure of Urizen, perceived that for 
the faculty of Reason, “to accept the reality of the natural world is automatically to be 
plunged into despair and paranoia about the status of the self” (Quinney 2009, p. 
51).  
 
5.4: Soul 
For my purposes, the evidence for Urizen’s effect on our souls can be found in the 
overuse of measurement and analysis of the individual; the point where the idea of a 
soul as an inner perspective is lost and “this results in the body becoming ‘mere’ 
matter. As a result, other human beings, too, appear no more than things” 
(McGilchrist 2009, p. 439). Instead of body and spirit being separate, for McGilchrist, 
what matters is our embodied relationship with the world around us and he provides 
useful guidance on how we might assess the impact of the left hemisphere thinking 
style on the soul in his observations of the work of William Shakespeare and John 
Donne: “They lament the loss of the relation of part to whole, of individual to 
community, of the context, the cosmos, to which each single soul belongs – each 
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now standing alone” (McGilchrist 2009, p. 327). To find Urizen in the domain of the 
soul, I will look for examples of people being treated as objects unworthy of empathy, 
deemed to be lacking interior richness and whose potential relationship to something 
greater themselves or their institutions is discounted. In Blake’s time, the 
transformation of the world through measurement and analysis was represented in 
the work of Sir Isaac Newton. For Blake, the problem with Newton’s work “was that it 
left out God, man, life, and all the values which make life worth living” (Damon 1988, 
p. 298).  
 
The abstraction of people into data in psycho-social healthcare leads to alienation 
but it is handled by forcing NHS CCGs to demonstrate effectiveness by analytics, not 
by the individual patient's sense of what they need to solve their problem, which may 
not involve psychological treatment. The CCGs are forced to collude in the deception 
because if they fail, they are punished by the withholding of funds from NHS 
England. The drive for data is also self-undermining; the CCGs have to not only 
increase the numbers that enter treatment, but also increase the numbers being 
shown to have recovered (National IAPT Programme Team 2012). This is 
contradictory, as the wider the net is cast, the more likely it is that it will bring in a 
broader range of people with even more complex problems. Yet these more complex 
cases will either be rejected outright for not fitting the model or else rushed through 
the system far more quickly than their complexity warrants. The Department of Heath 
stated that it would “look to identify PCTs where: … numbers entering treatment fail 
to improve in line with planned trajectories” (National IAPT Programme Team 2012, 
p. 5). Under this pressure, the PCTs (the Primary Care Trusts which were later 
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changed into CCGs under statute) would not accept patients who were unlikely to 
recover or whose illness could not fit easily into a measurable category.    
 
The problems identified by Dorling (2016) as key factors in happiness are not 
recognised by IAPT because they are social rather than psychological, and the areas 
important to his work relate to problems inherent to the dominant liberal ideology 
such as inequality, social mobility and income. The signifiers upholding this structure 
fail to maintain their pretence when scrutinised closely.  
 
The sickness of the soul can be manifested in the emotional health of those who live 
within a society built along Urizenic lines. Urizenic values (a list of the left 
hemisphere functions, taken from McGilchrist (2009), is in Appendix One) run 
counter to what is expected to promote and sustain human wellbeing when applied 
without any critical reflection and in isolation. Sundquist, Frank and Sundquist (2004) 
identify a link between urban living and psychosis and I believe that the stresses 
faced by such populations are one of the mechanisms by which Urizen thrives: 
people treated as isolated units to be densely packed and managed en masse by a 
remote management structure. In the absence of integral mechanisms to balance 
these problems, the population feels that they need counselling for everyday matters 
and then comes to expect it as the normal supplement to their lives (Furedi 2004). 
Eckersley describes a state of “cultural fraud” (2006, p. 256) by which the 
individualism being promoted as beneficial to the economy is having a deleterious 
psycho-social effect, such as with increased suicide rates.    
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Metrics are used to measure efficacy in the field of social wellbeing. Their collection 
and the adherence to detailed guidelines give the system the illusion that it has a full 
understanding of a situation and is addressing it in the best possible way. The 
workers within such a system have to make the metrics succeed and this can come 
at the expense of the people they are supposed to care for. The social workers 
assigned to the family responsible for the death in 2007 of seventeen-month-old 
Peter Connelly (known afterwards as Baby P) were strongly criticised by the media 
even though they had followed protocols designed to protect individual liberties 
promoted by the same systems (the media as well as social services) that damned 
them. The safety arrangements can still be subverted by those who have become 
adept at foiling surveillance by social care agencies (Jones 2014; Warner 2014) but 
the overburdened social workers are blamed for a system that can be subverted.  
 
McGilchrist’s (2009) portrait of a culture in thrall to left hemisphere tropes is one 
where social injunctions become arbitrary and inconsistent. Žižek (2009a) describes 
how, for a system to function, there must be tacit rules for its subversion because the 
underpinning markers for the system of symbolic exchange are empty in the first 
place. In the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991, people suffered 
because the codes of the shadow system which had previously helped citizens 
traverse the impasses of the communist structure were no longer valid (Žižek 
2009a). With the loss of usual norms, people do not know the new implicit rules. 
Informal rules that are understood to be empty make up the domain of habits that 
facilitate interaction (Žižek 2009a). Under an Urizenic system which would not 
understand an informal process, navigation through a social space, by which one 
would expect to acquire increased understanding, becomes a journey deeper into 
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the unknown. As with my study of ideological practices in the NHS, previously 
innocuous phrases are now assumed to provoke offence (Hanson 2014a) so that 
anyone can have the “right to remain at a safe distance from others” (Žižek 2009a, p. 
41) and use the inherent uncertainty in social encounters to further their own ends 
rather than society’s.  
 
Under Urizen, a person is objectified as a unit of measure, an item valued for its 
function. A person’s intrinsic quality as a human being, someone with a soul, is lost. 
 
It is with the right hemisphere that we distinguish individuals of all kinds, 
places as well as faces. In fact it is precisely its capacity for holistic 
processing that enables the right hemisphere to recognise individuals. 
Individuals are, after all, Gestalt wholes: that face, that voice, that gait, 
that sheer ‘quiddity’ of the person or thing, defying analysis into parts 
(McGilchrist 2009, p. 51). 
 
As an example of objectification, children in the United States are being named after 
brands (BBC News 2003), a trend which is likely to have been followed in the UK, 
but for which it is hard to find available research. Professor Cleveland Evans of 
Bellevue University, who monitors naming trends in the United States but does not 
appear to publish on this specific phenomenon other than through media interviews, 
states that this can be seen as simply an extension of the same aspirations 
expressed by earlier generations who, for example, named children after precious 
stones (BBC News 2003). But I believe that there are points of difference. Firstly, in 
earlier times, objects could represent something with a depth of meaning, in a similar 
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vein to work by Levi-Strauss (1966) and Douglas (2001) on tribal groups having a 
relationship to natural phenomena in their environment which had shared meaning 
beyond the mundane. Secondly, those things had an identity in themselves, as 
physical entities that were present to the observer and which could produce a 
tangible effect by their presence, such as flora and fauna. They were not brands with 
a superficial message intended to sell products. McGilchrist (2009) states that unlike 
the right hemisphere’s capacity to appreciate the unique quality of a gift, the left 
hemisphere of the brain is suited to understand money as an abstracted form of this 
idea which has been generalised. In a press interview, Evans expressed his concern 
that “parents are giving the message that children are possessions” (Deam 2003, 
unpaginated) and that parents want their children to be marked as different. These 
children are named after material things, often ones representing luxury, exclusivity 
or individuality (Deam 2003).  
 
Žižek’s work also provides evidence for Urizen’s assault on the soul through its effect 
on the people who comprise the social body but who feel that their inner life is not 
being accounted for by those with authority and influence over them. Žižek (2011b) 
described the 2011 riots in the UK following the shooting of Mark Duggan as a 
spasmodic acting out – passage a l’acte - which was being imbued with an excess of 
meaning by some commentators. One year earlier, Sharpe and Boucher presaged 
the riots as well as Žižek’s position: “for Žižek, the post-political consensus in the 
West is an effort to suppress ‘social antagonism’ – the sorts of volatile 
disagreements about basic values and social institutions that lead to real political 
opposition” (2010, p. 36). McGilchrist (2009) states that the left hemisphere does not 
acknowledge its failings even when the facts are presented to it. Žižek’s 
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observations on internal antagonisms erupting and a population resorting to 
passages a l’acte because they are unable to influence the authorities fits this picture 
of a structure that refuses to recognise problems which are common knowledge for 
those excluded from power and who feel that their treatment is based on data that 
purports to represent them rather than on an understanding of their situation.   
 
We can also see similar eruptions if we look at spirituality or religion, the traditional 
setting for ideas about the soul. Recruits to Islamic State (IS) leaving their privileged 
Western upbringing for the uncertainty of the civil war in Syria are performing the 
same spasmodic lurch towards self-satisfaction as other similar acts of jouissance 
(Lacan’s (2010) term for the libidinal excess which is unstated but the true driving 
force behind exchanges) to replace the absence of meaning at home. A United 
Nations study found that the typical foreign IS recruit was: 
 
most likely to be male, young and disadvantaged economically, 
educationally, and in terms of the labour market. He is also more likely 
than not to come from a marginalized background, both socially and 
politically. Most were unemployed, or underemployed, and/or said that 
their life lacked meaning (El-Said and Barrett 2017, p. 40).  
 
The acts of jouissance cross cultural boundaries between secular and religious 
expression, as expressed by the Tunisian Islamist politician Rached Ghannouchi, in 
his comments on recruitment to IS quoted by Zakaria (2015, unpaginated): “‘Some 
people search for an ideology of violent protest against the established order. That’s 
not strange,” he said. “It has taken a religious garb today.’”   
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The examples in the preceding paragraphs show how Urizen exposes itself in the 
domains of art, the body and the soul; three areas that are of importance to 
McGilchrist (2009) because the left hemisphere has difficulty understanding how it 
can manipulate them as instruments. The functions specific to the left hemisphere - 
of isolating, fragmenting and abstracting - can be seen in these examples as well as 
some points of correspondence with Žižek’s ideas once they emerge into the social 
body. To reiterate: the processes themselves are not a problem, for the human mind 
to be able isolate, fragment and abstract information is essential for survival. The 
difficulty occurs once these become the prime motive, taken to an extreme and 
misapplied. In the next chapter I will track the movement of these influences on a 
wider scale. Tweedy (2012) observes how the negative influence of British imperial 
expansion in the eighteenth century was depicted in Blake’s work and I will look at 
how Urizen projects itself onto the world stage. As with previous examples, this will 
be explored via wellbeing because it is a point of friction where a system attempts to 
resolve psycho-social difficulties created by its own social planning.  
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Chapter 6: Urizen Goes Global 
 
6.1: Incubation 
To trace Urizen’s outward growth requires a look at the conditions in which it is 
incubating. The first area to consider is how Western liberalism copes with its 
failings. Žižek (1989) describes ideologies concealing their internal antagonisms and 
McGilchrist (2009) warns that the left hemisphere does not recognise its errors as its 
own. When scaled upwards as national policy, these mindsets produce a system that 
applies rules but which refuses to be open about their negative consequences. This 
extends from areas such as wellbeing into foreign policy, a process I will now show. 
Using the analogy of an infection, in this chapter I will describe how Urizenic 
tendencies are incubated in a domestic setting and how Urizen’s cultural impact 
influences domestic politics before it spreads internationally. For Blake, the analytic 
mindset represented by figures such as Sir Isaac Newton, Roger Bacon and John 
Locke promoted unrest in many settings. According to Damon, Blake felt that “the 
cruel philosophy of materialism has spread from England over the world” (Damon 
1988, p. 299).  
 
In the field of wellbeing there exists the mythology within the liberal system that it 
possesses cures for its own antagonisms. Problems which stem from lack of social 
mobility are seen as psychological responses within the individual, not deficiencies 
within the system. The New Economics Foundation (NEF) promotes the Five Ways 
to Wellbeing:  
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The concept of wellbeing comprises two main elements: feeling good and 
functioning well. NEF has developed a set of five evidence-based actions 
to improve personal wellbeing. The 5 ways to wellbeing are: connect, be 
active, take notice, keep learning, and give (NEF Publications 2016, 
unpaginated).  
 
Public Health England admits that this strategy is supposed to be a foundation for 
wellbeing, that it is “an upstream intervention, not a treatment for those already ill” 
(Public Health England 2014, p. 49) and yet it discusses neither lack of social 
mobility nor poverty, nor does it analyse the effects upon the human spirit of the 
urban landscape in which the strategy will be deployed. It actually appears to be 
more of a strategy for concealing antagonisms. The statement in the forward that 
“the evidence shows that effective marketing is one key lever for catalysing change, 
and PHE will invest in it” (Public Health England 2014, p. 5) indicates that the 
strategy is based more on convincing a population rather than meaningfully changing 
their material conditions in the long term.  
 
The Five Ways to Wellbeing appears to be a pastiche of the guidance given by 
philosophers over the last two and a half millennia on how to live a meaningful 
existence, as summarised by Nehemas (2000). It is Urizenic in that it has abstracted 
various ideas away from their original context in the belief that their simple re-
application in a modern setting, without accounting for the effects of twenty-first 
century approaches to technology and economics, will paper over the problems of 
high-density living in post-industrial inner cities where those without access to key 
opportunities early on are unlikely to improve on their prospects for employment or 
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upward social movement. As with IAPT, further speculation about alternative causes 
for emotional distress, such as the system itself, is omitted.  
 
Urizen, as manifested via the NHS, does not regard itself as something that may 
create or amplify the difficulties within an ideological structure. In 2015 NHS 
England’s chief executive Simon Stevens announced that staff would be offered 
Zumba classes to reduce sickness rates (BBC News 2015b). This occurred two 
months before junior doctors threatened strike action related to pay and working 
conditions. Stevens’ proposal is reminiscent of the way that patients with right 
hemisphere damage will adopt the left hemisphere’s strategy of misrepresenting 
facts which are demonstrably wrong, such as claiming to be able to lift an 
incapacitated arm but suddenly announcing that it is not really their arm after all 
when challenged on why they have not done so (McGilchrist 2009) – a phenomenon 
known as hemispatial neglect. By framing the problems of staff absenteeism as one 
that needed only a facile solution, the NHS does not have to openly discuss other 
potential causes of sickness absence such as poor management and debilitating 
work stress. This attitude of presenting the problem in a certain way and failing to 
understand how it does not help is typical of Urizen and is a useful way of 
understanding NHS failures in the field of emotional wellbeing. The IAPT programme 
is the equivalent of these Zumba classes: it may help some people and it is 
organised in such a way that success can be claimed by the number of sessions 
delivered and attendance rates, but it is a denial of other more pressing factors. The 
therapist and the client both represent different parts of the same ideological process 
to each other, while above them, NICE (2009) guidelines impose a meaning: the 
perceived problem and its resolution are framed in a way that presents social 
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difficulties as matters of psychology, unconnected to societal factors such as status, 
wealth inequality or the inability to materially change one’s lived circumstances.  
 
The examples above have included PHE’s policy on social intervention, the IAPT 
programme and the attempts by the NHS to address sickness within its own ranks. I 
have described an ideology of healthcare informed by the ideals of Urizen and, 
following McGilchrist's (2009) argument, one which seeks to reproduce itself through 
imposing replication of its worldview rather than encouraging true innovation. In 
keeping with McGilchrist’s predictions, the closed mindset has abstracted any 
meaningful discussion of the human experience into terms such as wellbeing which 
then becomes generalised to mean whatever Urizen declares it to be. Urizen’s 
success in delivering wellbeing – whatever that actually is – can be proved by the 
metrics that Urizen creates to define the term. This system is unaware even of the 
existence of its blind spots, let alone of what they may comprise. The most recent 
example is the vanguardism of the cognitive behaviourist lobby in claiming to be the 
bow wave of improving wellbeing while limiting it by only approving a fraction of what 
is available and restricting who can access it by stringent criteria that are designed 
around their model of illness rather than a collaborative formulation with the patient 
of their wider needs beyond that specific psychological viewpoint. They have taken 
for themselves the role of pioneering the change until the public have been educated 
enough to look after the project for themselves.  
 
I am describing the incubation process by which Urizen self-replicates before 
exporting itself. So far, I have looked at policy but the self-replication also includes 
the establishment of power structures and elites. One is left to question what IAPT’s 
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true purpose was because it has been a successful model for channeling millions of 
pounds into the psychology departments of select establishments, strengthening the 
careers of those who publish and develop courses which reinforce the approved 
paradigm, and invigorating the career structure for the field of psychology at the 
expense of sociology, social work and children’s services. Yet if we judge IAPT by its 
declared original purpose – improving wellbeing to reduce unemployment in a 
manner that will pay for itself (Layard et al. 2006) – it has failed. An investigation by 
Pulse in 2013 (Price 2013) found that targets were not being met and recovery rates 
were slipping. Two years later a report by the Health Foundation found that the 
figures for 2015 had elements of both success and failure, based on information 
which showed that IAPT had changed its data sets in the second quarter of the 
2013/2014 period (Dormon 2015). In other words, because the project was failing, it 
simply changed the criteria by which it judged itself and even that did not work. 
Layard has allowed an elite to benefit but a decade later we have a failed system 
propped up by massaged figures. This response to problems is like the earlier 
example of hemispatial neglect.  
 
The elusive wellbeing aimed for by the social planners behind IAPT remains out of 
reach because the metrics allege the psychological progress of some individuals 
despite absence of meaningful change in the surrounding social environment. Based 
on Laclau’s (2007) work on empty signifiers, I have predicted (Hanson 2014b) that 
Urizenic healthcare ideologies would be indicated by the presence of place-holders 
for what is absent, that the system would signify a certain value but it would be an 
empty gesture.  
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If we consider again the idea of Five Ways to Wellbeing mentioned earlier (NEF 
Publications 2016), even if there were not more pressing issues such as gang 
violence, overcrowded housing estates and lack of green space, the target audience 
is deprived of the means to attain the five ways easily because their playing fields 
have been sold and their libraries closed.  
 
The communities targeted by PHE are themselves in thrall to Urizen; they are 
isolated pockets lacking coherent master signifiers which could provide substantial 
meaning. An Urizenic system is broadcasting a series of guidelines at an Urizenic 
population and the possibility of alternative perspectives about the issues is never 
featured in the documents.  
 
Urizen shapes a society by promoting ways of being that foster its worldview. 
McGilchrist contends that 
 
the innate structures of the left hemisphere are, through technology, being 
incarnated in the world it has come to dominate. But the left hemisphere 
would appear to be unsatisfied with this, because it still leaves possible 
exits from the maze, from the hall of mirrors, unbarred (2009, p. 388). 
 
6.2: Cross-Infection from Culture to Politics 
I have described the ways that Urizen exposes itself at the point where society 
attempts to heal its difficulties via a healthcare system. The next stage in 
understanding how Urizen exports itself globally is via the transition from culture into 
politics.  
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The conceptual artists known as Gilbert and George (Gilbert Proesch and George 
Passmore) claim that their work is social commentary. It tends to be based on 
collages of disparate images, often including themselves. Gilbert and George admire 
former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, a politician who, like the conceptual artists, 
seemed to abstract information without accounting for the whole. An inability to 
nuance how a shifted context in relation to one piece of information can change the 
meaning of the whole is an indicator of a left hemisphere process at work 
(McGilchrist 2009). Thatcher’s former Scottish Secretary, Malcolm Rifkind, describes 
how she could understand an issue but not empathise with it (BBC Scotland 2009, 
04:25–05:00). He once advised her to stop using the alienating phrase you in 
Scotland and to replace it with the more collegial we. But, unable to intuit the shifted 
context, she then addressed a conference there several times with the phrase: “we 
in Scotland,” (BBC Scotland 2009, 06:10–07:30), leaving Rifkind confused over how 
a well-educated person could make such an error. Her biographer notes that “the 
novelist and travel writer Jonathan Raban saw her as a total philistine – ‘she doesn’t 
appreciate doubleness, contradictions, paradox, irony, ambiguity’ and, to her, 
paintings, books and ideas were ‘just so much Black Forest gateau’,” (Moore 2015, 
p. 636). What Raban described is a list of the mental processes that are anathema to 
the left hemisphere (McGilchrist 2009). The same problems of disjunction, 
juxtaposition, ambiguity and meaning that were described earlier in the description of 
Urizenic influence on art (Chapter 5.2) are also apparent in politics. 
 
My use of these examples is not intended to make a point about the Conservative 
Party; rather, they are used in order to demonstrate examples of Urizen, its 
pervasiveness and the subtlety of clues sometimes indicating it. Hence the ease with 
63 
 
which Thatcher was able to state that Tony Blair and New Labour were her greatest 
achievements (Burns 2008): Urizenic processes transcend political divisions. 
IAPT was Blair’s domestic equivalent of the 2003 Iraq invasion: neoliberalism’s 
passage a l’acte based on a closed view of the problem and its solution. Our crisis 
arises from Urizen and the same mindset is used by political authorities and social 
planners in an attempt to solve it. 
 
6.3: Pandemic 
Urizen’s domestic influence can be scaled upwards to become international policy. 
As Curtis observes in his criticism of foreign policy in Afghanistan:  
 
All kinds of groups came to Kabul to help the project. It was like a 
snapshot of what those in power in America and Britain believed made 
democracy work. As well as the obvious lessons in how to organise 
elections and conferences on how to stop the narcotics trade, young 
Afghan students were also given lessons in how to make conceptual art  
(Curtis 2015, 1:47:44-1:48:14).  
 
In McGilchrist’s portrayal of a world dominated by left hemisphere values, “art would 
become conceptual” (2009, p. 433).  
 
Žižek’s position is that tension is pre-programmed into the Western mindset. Internal 
threats appear external: “the appearance of the fundamentalist Other … is the way 
that the effects of contradictions within Western social reality appear as an external 
threat arising from without” (Sharpe and Boucher 2010, p. 35; italics in the original). 
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My addition to this is that the weapons used to attack the perceived threat without 
are also then turned inwards. Policies implemented on the back of military 
intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan are echoed in the strategies applied to the home 
population. The counter-insurgency doctrine makes use of Shaping: a strategy 
designed to influence the domestic population as well as the Afghans (Ministry of 
Defence 2009). This has morphed into a strategy of applying the positivist metrics of 
local community construction projects used to portray perceived success in 
Afghanistan to be used as various indices of wellbeing among the home population. 
The dynamics of Afghan culture were so subtle that the Western planners were 
unable to see the unintended consequences of their actions and how well-
intentioned projects to build schools and playgrounds were ineffectual in altering the 
overall tensions between the incomers and the host population (Ledwidge 2011). 
Similarly, the architects of IAPT can disregard the lived experience of those who 
exist under difficult social conditions because they judge the success of the 
programme by its own measures, which can be manipulated to create a certain 
impression (Griffiths and Steen 2013a), rather than by what is important to the local 
population. The expansionist mindset projected outwards into the world in 2001 
returned in the form of IAPT in 2006 (IAPT 2016) and the Five Ways to Wellbeing 
programme in 2016 (New Economics Foundation 2016).  
 
Rumsfeld’s (2002) infamous pre-Iraq War speech about known unknowns, as 
studied by Žižek, is an example of an Urizenic declaration. In the speech, Rumsfeld 
lists three of the four possible ways of relating knowns to unknowns but omits the 
fourth, unknown knowns: the one that is covertly influencing decisions. Žižek (2004) 
cites this as an example of how our unconscious desires and prejudices influence us 
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without our acknowledgment of them, and McGilchrist uses the speech as an 
example of how the left hemisphere does not understand the need for the right 
hemisphere: “in a Rumsfeldean way, it’s not aware of what it’s not aware of” (2012b, 
1:05:24-1:05:28). 
 
The trope of professed neutrality which is oppressive in its efforts to be seen as truly 
liberal, was exemplified by the then Prime Minister Blair’s statement: “I think most 
people who have dealt with me, think I’m a pretty straight sort of guy and I am” (BBC 
One 1997, unpaginated). Planning for the invasion of Iraq began only five years after 
this statement and it then took over a decade for Blair to come the closest yet to 
admitting that his foreign policy had contributed to the 2015 refugee crisis and 
growth of radical non-state actors in the Middle East (CNN 2015). A leader who was 
earlier touting his liberal democratic credentials later embarked on a military 
campaign which, by his own belated admission, caused immense upheaval.  
 
The imperial enterprises criticised by Blake (1809) are repeated today on a greater 
scale and justified with subtler artifice than basic imperial expansion. Contemporary 
Western campaigns in the Middle East and Asia have been conducted under shifting 
guises: defeating terrorism, bringing democracy, promotion of women's rights, 
curbing heroin production, stability of a volatile region and so on (Johnson and Leslie 
2004). Institutions such as the British East India Company of the seventeenth 
century cannot be seen simply as a forerunner of the modern military industrial 
complex because the limited technology of that era demanded longevity, an 
investment of time and long-term physical presence in the foreign locale. This led to 
intermarriages and the cultural bleed of the colonised into the host: it was this kind of 
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threat to Western identity that prompted the Christian missionary zeal within India 
that culminated in the 1857 uprisings (Dalrymple 2006). Before travel by rail and air 
telescoped distance, Urizenic tendencies could be absorbed more readily by time 
and topography. The campaign to transplant our own mythical social stability on a 
reluctant host abroad has turned inwards to enforce upon our domestic population a 
certain view of what wellbeing should be. The mentality applied abroad to 
Afghanistan is utilised against the perceived threat to our economic values at home.  
 
Baudrillard, in his analysis of the idea of a simulacrum being put into practice during 
the 1990–1991 Gulf War, describes how the idea of precision becomes a leitmotif 
which adds to the deception to the point where the war “is no longer measured 
against an adversary but against its abstract operation alone” (1991, p. 45). The 
public, indifferent to this state of affairs, nevertheless give their consent to be 
frightened. To take these ideas about the Gulf War into the present, we can say that 
the public continue to give consent to have their emotions guided by the abstraction 
of data.    
 
Urizen is unable to empathise and it is suspicious of its own population as well as of 
the Other. This suspicion is obvious when exhibited as part of foreign policy but it is 
also present domestically in healthcare delivery. McGilchrist (2012a) describes a 
lack of trust which is associated with the need to control and to reinforce an 
established view. He uses the example of research that is not funded unless it is 
identical to what is already known.  
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Urizen wages war against whatever it sees as alien, even if it is of the same 
nationality. The home population needing emotional support from the NHS because 
their social underpinnings have decayed are the collateral damage resulting from 
what Foucault (2010) foresaw as the liberal ideals turned into neoliberal 
competitiveness and its consequent inequalities. Klein (2008) describes one 
consequence of the use of shock strategies derived from the neoliberal economics of 
what became known as the Chicago School being that the emotional response of a 
population is regarded as secondary to the competitive advantages that might be 
gained by an elite. The methods by which neoliberalism functions have now become 
so arcane and far reaching that it is hard to unpick exactly what the process is. As 
economics increases its influence on politics, a certain form of self-reflexivity in the 
system is lost so that it can no longer really understand its own activity and 
motivations (Davies 2014).   
 
6.4: Urizen Manifesting Beyond Western Culture  
Earlier, I mentioned Eckersley’s (2006) view that the attitude of individualism 
promoted in Western liberal economies was having a harmful effect on people. 
Dressler criticizes Eckersley for over-simplifying arguments about culture into a 
binary of the “west versus the rest” (Dressler 2006, p. 258) but I see Eckersley’s 
comments as helpful indicators of Urizen’s pan-cultural influence in the wake of 
Western cultural expansion into other parts of the globe. Also, Dressler is writing at a 
time before the 2015 exodus of refugees from the Middle East into Europe, an effect 
of Urizenic foreign policy by the West which its own architects accept as causal 
(CNN 2015). Just as in Blake’s era, there is a particular manifestation of Urizen 
prevalent today that fits the West’s expeditionary strategy: the use of technology to 
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extend military and political influence because it regards its worldview as a worthy 
export.       
 
When looking at examples of problems created by attitudes prevalent in the West 
there is a risk of over privileging the Other, of seeing the non-Western as a source of 
something better. Žižek (2016) warns of a liberal tendency to push tolerance to the 
degree where it impinges on the freedoms of some members of the same community 
that the West is attempting to accept by, for example, permitting cultural practices 
where children are kept away from school, forced into underage marriages and 
women are controlled by social codes related to clothing and behaviour.  
 
I wish to show that the same process of excessive abstraction which is a hallmark of 
Urizen and which was present in my earlier descriptions of the management of 
healthcare can arise in an area that is the apparent opposite of Western healthcare: 
Islamic extremism poised against the West. McGilchrist is concerned with the left 
hemisphere’s capacity to misuse its abstracting principle. Žižek also sees a difficulty 
caused by over-abstraction, suggesting that we ask “to what extent our own abstract 
multiculturalism has contributed to this sad state of affairs” (Žižek 2016, p. 99). 
Writing about Western anti-immigrant populists, Žižek observes that “one should be 
more attentive to the hidden proximity between them and fundamentalist Islamists” 
(2017, p. 171). Urizen is visible with extremists from IS, whose members can 
imagine being older but also being dead: a process that requires them to be 
comfortable with ignoring the whole. This is in keeping with the earlier references to 
hemispatial neglect found through the isolated left hemisphere such as with stroke 
patients disavowing one of their own limbs, claiming that it is simply not theirs 
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despite its remaining naturally connected to their own body (McGilchrist 2009). A 
journalist who obtained access to young IS recruits reported:  
 
Our team was granted relatively free access to the fighters, who had 
clearly been given orders to cooperate from above. This included being 
permitted to interview two would-be teenage suicide bombers who, on the 
one hand, appeared frustrated at having not yet fulfilled their mission and, 
on the other, talked excitedly about their hopes for when they grow up 
(Doran 2015, unpaginated). 
 
Islamic fundamentalists misuse the Quran and Hadith by partially quoting out of 
context or ignoring alternative explanations. For example, the verse “Kill them 
wherever you encounter them” (Quran 2:191) was originally used to clarify the rules 
of engagement if attacked on pilgrimage in Mecca (Haleem 2010) but is often used 
by extremists to justify massacres. The terror group IS has made use of a prophecy 
by Mohammed about a battle centred on Dabiq/Dabeeq (Al Areefi 2010) to give 
credence to their claim to be the rightful heirs of his legacy, but in doing so they 
ignore another prophecy which describes a group very much like IS and which is 
highly critical of it (Chaudhry 2015).  
 
Research suggests that of those Muslims from an academic background who were 
drawn to extremism, those with an engineering mindset were over-represented while 
there was an almost complete absence of those with an academic background in the 
social sciences – phenomena attributed to the different thinking styles required in 
those disciplines: the former rigid and definite, the latter embracing the ambiguous 
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and critical (Rose 2015). The highest qualification in CBT under IAPT is an MSc 
rather than an MA: a parallel of the thinking style identified by Rose (2015) as 
operationalising Islamic extremism, a preference for the definiteness promised by 
science over the ambiguities accepted within art. The ideological system behind 
wellbeing wants the healing process between two potentially creative humans to be 
artless, non-creative and predictable. 
 
 
6.5: Common Themes: Abstraction, Context, Juxtaposition and Meaning 
The thread running through the preceding chapters has been about the left 
hemisphere’s specialism for isolating information, abstracting it and presenting it 
anew (McGilchrist 2009). An important aspect of the mind’s construction of its world 
is that information is taken out of its original setting and analysed separately, 
something that should be done with a view to re-integrating the new findings back 
into the whole (McGilchrist 2009). When this methodology becomes an end in itself, 
it produces material that can be overly abstracted, overly de-contextualised, 
juxtaposed too closely with other items and which can have its original meaning 
distorted. Instead of a harmonious re-integration of the knowledge that the left 
hemisphere has analysed, there is instead a disjunct, a problem which the Urizenic 
system conceals as normalcy (McGilchrist 2009). This is similar to the ideological 
practices that Žižek (1989) describes. I have described Urizen’s influence in the field 
of wellbeing and Western foreign policy. The excessive use of fragmented, 
abstracted and de-contextualised information can also indicate Urizen’s influence in 
other settings.       
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Just as with the evidence taken from split-brain studies and developed by 
McGilchrist, the mentality of the suicide bomber and certain forms of tattoo referred 
to earlier are examples of how information is isolated, removed from its context and, 
to use McGilchrist's descriptor, re-presented in a way that manipulates its meaning 
and influences those involved in its transmission and processing. Borowski describes 
how, amongst the social media of IS militants, “decapitated heads are casually 
juxtaposed with pictures of kittens, and of selfies with freshly baked cakes. Beyond 
shock value, this makes for an unsettling confusion of genres” (2015, p. 25). It is the 
close proximity of unrelated items which indicates the workings of the left 
hemisphere because it is unable to see the whole. The left hemisphere is blind to the 
fact that presenting isolated fragments together in the same space changes the 
quality of the overall arrangement because it is unable to comprehend the larger 
view of which the fragments are a part (McGilchrist 2009).  
 
After the IS-inspired attacks on Paris in November 2015, a photograph circulated 
across press agencies showing the female terrorist suspect Hasna Ait Boulahcen 
wearing a head-covering taken in a private moment as she was making an offensive 
gesture to the camera with both hands (BBC News 2015c – see also Appendix Two). 
The left hemisphere style of thinking is indicated here by the disjunct created by 
placing two mismatched symbols (the offensive gesture and the headscarf) in the 
same setting. These two symbols combined look out of place when viewed together 
as a whole, but not to a mindset that focuses only on the individual elements.      
 
My earlier projects (Hanson 2014a, 2015) showed examples of the left hemisphere’s 
effect on wellbeing for the individual as well as institutions. From that Urizenic 
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mindset emerge systems as seemingly diverse as the terrorist group IS and the false 
dawn of IAPT: one a distorted form of a spiritual tradition, the other a distorted form 
of a psychological one. Both focus on what is valuable to the entity itself rather than 
the population whom they claim to serve, and both possess that crucial ideological 
element; an object-cause of desire (Žižek 1989). For IAPT there is a mythical social 
environment which will come into being once a certain segment of the population 
have been cured of psychological ills that prevent them working – it was claimed that 
the treatment would pay for itself through the treated workforce returning to 
productivity (Layard 2005). The original claims for IAPT’s cost-effectiveness are 
flawed (Griffiths and Steen 2013b). For IS there is an idealised ummah – a Muslim 
community - waiting for the opportunity to be actualised.  
 
Disjunct and juxtaposition can be used creatively; Koestler (1964) proposed that two 
distinct conceptual planes could be held simultaneously to be viewed from a new 
frame of reference. Foucault (1967/1984) developed the idea of the term counter-site 
to describe a space where deliberate inversion can inform. Under an Urizenic 
system, these processes are mimicked but without true depth.  
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Chapter 7: Potential Responses to Urizen 
I have given examples of how the neurological feature described by McGilchrist 
(2009) can be tracked and understood when manifesting within culture through the 
figure of Urizen, as exemplified by Tweedy (2012). I have also used Žižek’s ideas 
about society as the surrounding framework for better understanding the effects of 
Urizen. I have shown how Urizen influences the way in which the culture attempts to 
heal itself of societal problems in the field of wellbeing and how this attitude then 
extends outwards at an international level. Having described the nature of what is 
occurring and the methods involved in producing it, I will now look at possible 
responses. 
 
7.1: The Real 
The real is that which falls outside the symbolic order and it has been viewed by 
theorists such as Laclau (2007) as a space from which to resist ideological 
influences. The real is beyond our grasp, but the meaning that we give to our 
relationship to it is open to interpretation. Its meaning may be contested but can also 
be a space for the strange and marginal, those boundary elements which Douglas 
(2001) attests are healing as well as dangerous. It is the space from which the 
outrageous intrudes in the form of das Ding (Freud 1919) - the Freudian Thing - and, 
consequently, we need to look to that unknown aspect for inspiration beyond the 
responses which are limited to the known symbolic space. My work aims to find a 
dialogue with the real, whereas Urizen, opposed to ambiguity and what it cannot 
categorise, will attempt to colonise at source what emerges from it.  
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My earlier study (Hanson 2014a) showed how the aspect of the Urizenic system 
displayed in the NHS, which claims state responsibility for dispensing psychological 
treatments to enhance wellbeing, exposes itself at certain points, such as when that 
part of it which purports to be inclusive and to promote wellbeing for all, becomes 
compromised by the Lacanian real, by things that it cannot accommodate within its 
structure. Such examples are microcosms of a wider difficulty, that the 
manifestations of Urizen at the level of politics and social policy are so excessively 
rational that they cannot grasp the implications of the real, the point at which the 
symbolic order on which the rational is structured breaks down. The health system 
has irrational practices (Hanson 2014a) and those within it who advocate rationalism 
still accept their awards derived from an irrational undercurrent. This is to be 
expected: the law conceals its Law-is-Law tautology, its foundational violence (Žižek 
2003b, 2006b).  My response to this form of ideology in healthcare is to embrace the 
irrational, to look within it for traces of the real.    
 
7.2: The Real and Spiritual Traditions 
The Lacanian view of ideology sees a need for the individual to traverse the fantasy 
of the symbolic order upheld by the big Other (Žižek 1989). The subjects pre-
supposed by wellbeing services remain in thrall to an ideological system, the function 
of which “is not to offer us a point of escape from our reality but to offer us the social 
reality itself as an escape from some traumatic, real kernel” (Žižek 1989, p. 45). 
What is needed is an approach that traverses the fantasy maintained by these 
subjects of the ideologically grounded wellbeing services while also addressing the 
deeper concern of the traumatic kernel of the real. McGilchrist raises the difficulty of 
trying to escape from the left hemisphere’s increasingly self-reflexive “hall of mirrors” 
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(2009, p. 388) and suggests that the exit from such a closed system can be to reach 
beyond what the left hemisphere understands, to go to places that it cannot 
comprehend.  
 
The analytic left hemisphere, personified as Urizen, cannot tolerate what it is unable 
to accommodate within its worldview (McGilchrist 2009), whereas an approach that 
accommodates the concept of the esoteric not only accepts the unknown but 
understands that it plays a role in the subject’s way of being and even relies on that 
element of mystery. It acknowledges an empty centre that cannot be accessed but 
around which the more consciously recognisable features of the human psyche are 
noticed. 
 
In response to an ideology built on Urizenic principles, McGilchrist infers possible 
solutions which point towards the esoteric, those areas of spirituality and art which 
defy analysis and integration. In the following passage I interpret him as not only 
endorsing the esoteric, but also recognising that an Urizenic system is inherently 
vulnerable to what may erupt from the real:   
 
My theme may seem pessimistic. I do think that there are, nonetheless, 
reasons for hope. As will be obvious, I think we need, for one thing, 
urgently to move on from our current, limiting preconceptions about the 
nature of physical existence, spiritual life and art, and there are some 
small indications that this may be happening. Art and religion should not 
become part of the betrayal. Another reason for hope lies in the fact that, 
however much the left hemisphere sees progress as a straight line, it is 
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rarely so in the real world. The very circularity of things as they really are, 
rather than as the left hemisphere conceives them, might be a reason for 
hope (McGilchrist 2009, p. 445).  
 
In this section I will look at spirituality, which pushes against the extremities of what 
one accepts as provably true while remaining in some way definable and socially 
accepted. I do not advocate a theocracy - that could be an Urizenic form of 
spirituality - but I do suggest that there can be a meeting point where the theological 
and the secular both accept ambiguities within their systems. McGilchrist states:  
 
The problem is that logic doesn’t allow us what used to be called the 
coincidentia oppositorum, the fact that opposites often come together. 
This is ancient knowledge. It’s in Lao Tze … it’s in the philosopher 
Heraclitus … the idea is in Tantric Hinduism, it’s in Buddhism, it’s in 
German mysticism and it’s in Sufism; something can change and remain 
the same (McGilchrist 2014, 27:10–27:58). 
 
In trying to find some area of human life which encourages an openness to the real, 
the first area that I will look at is an esoteric tradition. Urizen is the aspect of the 
human psyche compelled to measure but esoteric traditions represent another 
aspect of ourselves which escapes this measurement because we never fully 
understand or control that part of ourselves. I will be using ideas found within Sufism; 
its esotericism is a fit for the real but it is connected to the routine practice of 
everyday living through the religious tradition in which it has been housed. Islam 
does not advocate monastic withdrawal from the world and, prior to his revelation as 
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well as to some extent afterwards, Mohammed was engaged in the same normal 
daily activities involving trade, family and social conventions as his peers. In his 
analysis of theology and politics from the perspectives of Žižek and Eagleton, 
Sigurdson reminds us that religion “was not, as in Western modernity, a sphere 
distinct from ‘politics’ or ‘economy’” (Sigurdson 2012, p. 29). A tradition that 
embraced the mystic might normally not be included in a study of healthcare or 
ideology, but at the time that it emerged these divisions were not so distinct. 
Sigurdson (2012) concludes that theology can be a site of resistance culturally, 
socially and as a theoretical resource provided that “God is not objectified as an alien 
power” (2012, p. 202) but is used as the ground for freedom and hope.       
 
My perspective is that Islam today has emerged being labelled as a religion for 
understandable reasons but its core appears to be far harder to fathom. To 
categorise Islam exclusively via its outward religious forms is to miss the part of it 
which escapes such symbolism, the esoteric aspect. This is applicable to many 
spiritual traditions which could be a vestige of something that is harder to define but 
Islam's temporal proximity to the present day, its identifiable formative characters 
and its subsequent impact make this process easier to observe. Campbell (1949) 
overcame the problem of trying to establish the concealed meaning behind external 
characteristics by describing the outer forms as metaphors for the inner. According 
to Sigurdson, Eagleton has “come to regard religious institutions as a possible site of 
resistance” (2012, p. 43). I am bound by the term religion for want of a suitable 
alternative. There were elements which existed before the schisms in Islam, before 
disagreements over leadership, before Islamic imperialism created a built-in friction 
against its attempts at spirituality. Linking some aspects of Islam to the Lacanian real 
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is an attempt to look again at something that is subtle and easily missed. In revisiting 
Islam through McGilchrist’s ideas on hemisphere differences and Lacan's conception 
of the real we may get closer to that original essence which is not represented. 
 
Islam can provide a framework for the model of an esoteric subject but on the 
understanding that the form of Islam I refer to cannot be merely a preserved version 
of the seventh-century Arabian tribal culture. Mohammed himself predicted that the 
world would fundamentally change after his death and that this change would also 
include how people lived and how they put into practice what he had transmitted to 
them (Kabbani 2003).  
 
Islam contains the idea that the human is forgetful, hence the Sufi exercise of zhikr 
(also Anglicised as dhikr): remembrance. This is something inherent to Sufism: we 
are forgetful of something that transcends us but we possess a hidden memory of it.  
Eagleton describes the subject’s relationship to their ideological surroundings as one 
of ignorance: “oblivion is thus our ‘natural’ mode” (2007, p. 177). From the 
perspective of an esoteric subjectivity, the Lacanian traversal of the fantasy can be 
seen as a form of remembrance: the Lacanian divided subject aiming to traverse the 
fantasy is like the torn – baz - Sufi longing for the divine (Sufis use the Persian term 
baz – open – to describe feeling torn). Žižek specifies 
 
the meaning of Lacan’s assertion of the subject’s constitutive 
‘decenterment’: its point is not that my subjective experience is regulated 
by objective unconscious mechanisms which are ‘decentered’ with regard 
to my self-experience and, as such, beyond my control (a point asserted 
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by every materialist), but, rather, something much more unsettling – I am 
deprived of even my most intimate ‘subjective’ experience, the way things 
‘really seem to me,’ that of the fundamental fantasy that constitutes and 
guarantees the core of my being, since I can never consciously 
experience it and assume it (2006a, p. 171).  
 
Sufism is fixed via Islam around a specific person and the evental revelation that 
ruptured the symbolic order of its time. According to Sufis, the record of its 
transmission, the Quran, contains within its text layers of hidden meaning, deliberate 
ambiguities, in keeping with the equivocation McGilchrist feels it is important to 
maintain (2009). The Quran recognises the existence of many prophets before 
Mohammed under a rubric that can incorporate figures from pre-Islamic doctrines; 
“every community is sent a messenger” (10:47) and “every community has been sent 
a warner” (35:24). Sufism comes from a lineage of methods that have facilitated the 
intrusion of the Real/real into the culture of the time.  
 
In the same way, Leszek Kolakowski has described mysticism as the 
revolt of the individual conscience against the system, the 'apparatus'. 
Mysticism is certainly a private experience which has an absolute value 
for the person involved, and so where the ‘system', that is the established 
framework of ideas and institutions, is opposed to its revelations it can 
indeed be such a revolt of experience. So, given the same conditions, can 
pure science or philosophy. But there are systems - the Catholic Church is 
one - which are sufficiently flexible and intelligent to have been able to 
channel this spontaneous mystical activity so as to give it a place, a role, 
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even to make use of the vital impulse as something which feeds it and to 
which it in turn gives rise. This is how Teresa of Avila and John of the 
Cross have remained great Catholic mystics, and ornaments of a Church 
they might have shaken. No similar institution existed in Arabia to channel 
Muhammad” (Rodinson 1985, p. 82). 
 
Sufism too is vulnerable to Urizen, when the term is used as a signifier whose 
meaning can be altered. There is an extant example of esoteric traditions such as 
Sufism being used in alternative ways. In the early twentieth century George 
Gurdjieff took elements of Sufism (Toussulis 2010) as well as a mixture of Greek 
philosophy, alchemy and Armenian traditions (Pittman 2008) and then re-presented 
it as a system of human mastery over nature through a set of exercises. These can 
then be turned into institutional practices once the founding figure dies. 
 
Mura (2014), using a Lacanian approach, develops what she describes as a limited 
range of work on the meeting point of psychoanalysis and Islam. For her study of 
Islamism through the discourse of Islam as a master signifier, the importance of the 
real lies not only in the failure of the symbolic (the experience of social lack in an 
Islamic setting) but also in how the real can account for this lack through the illusion 
of an idealised Islam that is unable to manifest itself. This may be a historic version 
or one that hopes for a new Islamic age (Mura 2014). Couched within Islam, Sufism, 
as a mundane term used to describe an encounter with the real, can be over-
identified with whatever master signifier Islam has come to be recognised by.  
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Shortly, I will revisit these above themes from the perspective of the massacre of the 
proto-Shia forces at Karbala in 680 AD as an example of signifiers connected with 
the esoteric having their meaning changed through violence.     
 
7.3: Žižek on Religion and the Esoteric 
Žižek (1997) sees Christianity as unique among religions as revealing, through the 
sense of forsakenness expressed by the crucified Christ, that there is no big Other.  
He places spirituality and religion in the same category and sees them as complicit in 
covering up the non-existence of the big Other, with the exception of the Christian 
crucifixion. According to Žižek (2012b), the position of the revolutionary and the 
analyst is to be aware of the big Other but not subject to it.  
 
Žižek (2001) uses Christianity rather than Sufism as a template but he has views on 
Gnosticism, which under his interpretation has similarities to Sufism: that of a divine 
spark lying unknown or forgotten within each person because they are taken up with 
worldly matters. Žižek (2001) concludes that instead of a return to a true form of self, 
Christianity calls for our reinvention. But I believe that the idea of abandonment and 
reinvention is not exclusive to Christianity. I will argue in later chapters that the 
potential which Žižek sees in Christianity can also be found within aspects of Islam, 
in the ideas found in Sufism and the psychological and cultural legacy of Karbala. 
Dabashi sees the similarities between the crucified Christ and the martyred Imam 
Hossein as “striking” (2011, p. 80) in that both were perceived as spiritually capable 
of receiving divine intervention against their aggressors but both opted to fulfill their 
destiny. Blake’s mysticism also subverts Gnosticism because any hidden gods 
separated from the human become an “inaccessible object of desire” (Quinney 2009, 
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p. 37). He believed instead that deities resided within the person themselves 
(Quinney 2009).   
 
Žižek’s version of Christ is not God and man, but the “divine dimension in man” 
(2001, p. 90) becoming visible. However, he also sees this divine aspect as an 
obstacle preventing humanity’s self-identification. According to Žižek’s Christianity, 
the death of Christ means there is no longer a place for “any God of Beyond” (2001, 
p. 91) and the only remainder is the Holy Spirit, Žižek’s term for the community of 
believing followers.  
 
Žižek’s (2003a) Christianity is an atheist one that requires redemption through 
abandoning its institutional structures, and he regards Islam as a fusion of the worst 
aspects of the Abrahamic faiths in having the superego that Christians claim of 
Judaism as well as the regression from monotheism into mythology that Jews can 
see in Christianity (Žižek 2001). Islam, for Žižek, has both superego and narrative. 
But Žižek’s criticism of Islam does not include aspects that are built on rupture, which 
I will explore later through the theme of Karbala and the sayings from Mohammed 
(the Hadith) which predicted the degeneration of his message.  
 
For Žižek, “the ‘Holy Spirit’ is the community deprived of its support in the big Other” 
(2003a, p. 172). This absence of God means that there is no afterlife in Žižek’s 
interpretation of Christianity, just as there was none in the Judaic tradition from which 
Christ emerged (Žižek 2001). For Žižek, there is no God and the divine spark is a 
disruption, but the theme of rupture remains. As with my brief reference to Karbala 
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above, this idea of rupture can be further explored through other ideas found in 
Islam.  
 
Islam can be seen as a reaction to the way that the religion of the time had been 
oriented towards the big Other through idol-worship and acquired a form by which to 
respond to it. Like any revolutionary movement, Islam was then free to install its own 
symbolic network, to maintain the big Other in a new form. For Žižek (2001), the 
prohibition on images is not because the spiritual may become humanised, but 
because it would “render it all too faithfully, as the ultimate Neighbor-Thing” (2001, p. 
130). Žižek (2001) states that only Christianity takes this to its conclusion in the 
likeness of God and man, as well as their mutual identity, in Christ. The result of the 
crucifixion, according to Žižek’s account, is that the responsibility for the divine 
programme lies with us. Later, I will develop further ideas about the impact of a 
spiritual legacy after a foundational traumatic event when I discuss the 
consequences of Karbala. 
 
7.4: Urizen and the Esoteric 
McGilchrist, as part of his argument about left hemisphere influence on culture, 
points out the ways that religions can be highly organised and abstracted from their 
spiritual origins but does not go much further beyond documenting the popularity and 
decline of religious movements alongside other cultural indicators. Tweedy’s 
development of McGilchrist’s themes through the works of Blake includes Blake’s 
conception of God. Tweedy (2012) helps to differentiate the ideas of the divine from 
those of a deity. According to Tweedy, Blake’s God is closely linked to the human 
experience and is not a remote entity requiring intercession: “for an abstract and 
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impersonal God, Blake maintained, is the invention of the rationalising Spectre, and 
is the sort of God invoked and adored by all Urizenic religions and philosophies” 
(Tweedy 2012, p. 201). Urizenic religions “are founded on the belief that God is more 
than man” (Tweedy 2012, p. 202). Blake, an opponent of religious orthodoxy also 
saw the human as divine. “Priesthood, according to Blake, did not originate in the 
belief that God was human, but in the belief that God was not human” (Tweedy 
2012, p. 204).  
 
Urizen has an etymological connection with the idea of horizon (Tweedy 2012). The 
horizon marked a limit, beyond which the remote gods of ancient cultures dwelt 
(Rundle Clark 1991). Blake felt that religions erred when they formulated their idea of 
God through abstract symbols, something in common with left hemisphere functions 
(McGilchrist 2009; Tweedy 2012). In Blake’s mythology, Urizen is made to see sense 
through the efforts of another of Blake’s creations: Albion. Tweedy explains Albion’s 
realisation that “Urizen and all the other orthodox ‘Gods’ are programs and powers 
within his own brain and being” (2012 p. 288). Frye (1969) describes Blake’s 
philosophy as one where man was cut off from his divine inheritance by religion, 
which he saw as belief in a nonhuman God. In comparing his theory about brain 
hemispheres to that of Jaynes (1976), McGilchrist describes how “the voices of 
intuition now appear ‘other’; familiar but alien, wise but uncanny – in a word, divine” 
(2009, p. 262). Parallels between Blake and Žižek can be seen in the refutation of a 
God outside of man and the idea of an internal authority figure (the big Other). 
Blake’s rejection of a priestly caste also aligns him with Žižek who regards the 
community as the Holy Spirit (2001, 2003a).  
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7.5: Other Perspectives: Blake and Kant 
Blake, as a mystic, an artist and a Briton living at a time of imperial expansion, also 
covers themes which are pertinent here with regard to the West’s relationship with 
other cultures. As a non-religious mystic (Berger 1914/2009), Blake is an example of 
esoteric ideas made active within a secular system. Blake was raised in a Christian 
setting, but he was a dissenter at a time when to be a non-believer carried risk 
(Ackroyd 1999). Frye’s view of Blake’s mysticism delineates him alongside non-
Western esoteric traditions:  
 
Unity with this God could be attained only by an effort of vision which not 
only rejects the duality of subject and object but attacks the far more 
difficult antithesis of being and non-being as well. This effort of vision, so 
called, is to be conceived neither as a human attempt to reach God nor a 
divine attempt to reach man, but as the realization in total experience of 
the identity of God and Man in which both the human creature and the 
superhuman Creator disappear. Blake’s conception of art as creation 
designed to destroy the Creation is the most readily comprehensible 
expression of this effort of vision I know; but the effort itself is the basis of, 
for instance, Zen Buddhism, which with its paradoxical humor and its 
intimate relationship to the arts is startlingly close to Blake (Frye 1969, p. 
431). 
 
McGilchrist, who does not utilise Lacanian concepts, sees value in aesthetics that 
transcend their surroundings. According to McGilchrist, the Romantics, for whom the 
sublime was a core concept, sought the sense of belonging to something greater 
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than themselves by being able to see through material phenomena. An encounter 
with the sublime “expands and extends, not dwarfs, the being of the beholder” 
(McGilchrist 2009, p. 363). The sublime has had different meanings over time; 
eloquent poetry, divinity, the inadequacy of human perception confronted by nature, 
the power of reason and as a symbol of what escapes reason (Shaw 2006). For 
McGilchrist, the sublime was best understood by the Romantics, while Kant, along 
with figures such as Bentham and Descartes, was a figure whose worldview was 
shaped by an objectifying, analytical left hemisphere thinking style. Žižek (1989) 
cautions against Kantianising the Lacanian real into a distinction between the 
noumenal and the phenomenal. Instead of something transcendent, Žižek’s sublime 
is “an indicator of the traumatic emptiness” (Shaw 2006, p. 138) beneath 
symbolisation. There is a “hideous sublimity” (Shaw 2006, p. 139) in the object that is 
preventing full ideological closure.      
 
Scruton (2001) describes Kant’s sentiment of the sublime as one where we are 
overcome by the greatness of the world and we abandon our efforts to understand or 
control it. For Žižek (1989), Kant’s sublime is paradoxical; it cannot be represented 
but the failure to do so indicates the greatness of what lies beyond and fanaticism 
occurs in the belief that one can grasp it. Both Žižek and McGilchrist respect its 
unattainable nature: “the sublime is more truly present when only partially visible” 
(McGilchrist 2009, p. 369). 
 
The theme of something that lies beyond human experience but remains 
unobtainable can be applied to ideas of the sublime, the real, the divided subject and 
the mystic. Blake is an example of a secular mystic at the dawning of a culture which 
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was being shaped by technology and imperialism - domains in which the left 
hemisphere excels. But Blake’s mysticism was firmly rooted in the workings of the 
human mind. Frye’s view of Blake, is that 
 
If mysticism means primarily a contemplative quietism, mysticism is 
something abhorrent to Blake … But if mysticism means primarily the 
vision of the prodigious and unthinkable metamorphosis of the human 
mind just described, then Blake is one of the mystics (Frye 1969, p. 432).  
 
7.6: Caveats on Spirituality from Žižek and McGilchrist  
McGilchrist lays out his views on spirituality from a different starting point to Žižek, 
not only as a neuroscientist but as someone who, unlike Žižek, neither declares 
himself an atheist nor privileges Christianity above other faiths, even from an atheist 
perspective. But there are points of correspondence between them in their distrust of 
some ideas that claim to be spiritual. 
 
Žižek (2003a, 2006a) is critical of the transcendental techniques which have 
increased in popularity in the West, designed around certain types of spirituality. He 
uses examples from Victoria (1997), based on the teachings of Suzuki (1959), to 
illustrate how meditative detachment can enable a combatant to psychologically 
distance themselves from the act of killing. Žižek writes that “spiritual meditation, in 
its abstraction from institutionalized religion, appears today as the zero level 
undistorted core of religion” (Žižek, Milbank and Davis 2011, p. 27) and argues that 
such an intimate experience through meditation is the ideological format most suited 
to global capitalism. This version of spirituality encourages its followers to avoid 
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trying to cope with the demands of technology and instead “renounce the very 
endeavor to retain control over what goes on … while retaining an inner distance and 
indifference” (2003a, p. 13).   
 
Žižek regards this type of solution as: 
 
the “Oriental” one: that, precisely, of Gelassenheit – we should remain 
active, engaged in the world; we should merely do it with an inner 
distance, without full attachment, maintaining intact throughout this 
engagement the core of our being – all the mystical rubbish about how, 
through the very incessant agility of its parts, the Whole is at peace with 
itself” (2006a, Loc 780). 
 
In the earlier description of meditation, the phrase “in its abstraction” (Žižek, Milbank 
and Davis 2011, p. 27) echoes McGilchrist’s concern with how abstraction is 
misused to distort information. When viewed under McGilchrist’s rubric, Žižek is 
saying that a certain element (in this case, meditation) has been taken away from its 
original context, abstracted into a new entity and then utilised to make money, 
another form of abstraction. McGilchrist’s views on the co-opting of spiritual traditions 
complements Žižek’s: “Thus 15 minutes Zen meditation a day may make you a more 
effective money broker, or improve your blood pressure, or lower your cholesterol” 
(McGilchrist 2009, p. 441). McGilchrist’s theory also links the detachment identified 
by Žižek with left hemisphere processes:   
The relative detachment from the body displayed by the left hemisphere, 
and its tendency to abstraction, normally serve its purposeful striving 
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towards individual gain. The left frontal lobe, however, brings distance, 
and allows the experience of the peaceful detachment from the material 
realm and ‘emptying out’ described by experts in meditation as a mystical 
experience (McGilchrist 2009, p. 91). 
Another point that Žižek raises about the misuse of spiritual ideals is summed up in 
the phrase: “no ethnic cleansing without poetry” (Irwin and Motoh 2014, p. 143). The 
leaders of a movement may be responsible for misleading the public but this 
manipulation occurs because the poets have already created a dream for people to 
follow (Žižek 2014a). 
 
McGilchrist (2009) not only criticises the overselling of Zen meditation, but he also 
believes that practices aimed at self-annihilation should instead be utilised as ways 
for people to understand their relation to a whole that is greater than the person. For 
McGilchrist, the brain hemispheres have two distinct forms of understanding 
individualism: where the left hemisphere sees the individual as an isolated unit, the 
right understands the interrelationship between the individual and the whole of which 
they are a part. 
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Chapter 8: The Influence of the Real and Mystery Traditions on the Subject 
Over the previous chapters, I have described how McGilchrist’s theory can manifest 
in society, especially in the field of psycho-social care, the means by which the social 
body tries to heal itself of the sort of problems that McGilchrist and Žižek explain. I 
have described this as an ideological process, and I have looked at how both 
McGilchrist and Žižek warn of the difficulties in trying to escape from the situations 
they each describe. I have proposed that there can be sites from which to resist 
Urizen and in this chapter I will look more closely at potential candidates for these 
sites of resistance.    
 
8.1: Sirr 
If there is some aspect of the real in the mystic tradition, what might it be? Even if 
Žižek rejects the Gnostic view and sees the divine spark as something problematic, 
how might one get an idea of what it is that is being rejected? If McGilchrist is correct 
about the possibility of sustaining an ambiguous but stable relationship between 
humanity’s mundane as well as their spiritual aspect, are there precedents for how 
might that be experienced? Mystic traditions carry the idea of a secret “unknown to 
both self and other” (Podmore 2017, p. 197). As a site of resistance, “mystical 
theology carves a ‘space’, inaccessible to exteriority” (Podmore 2017, p. 199).  
  
According to the Sufis, the human psyche has the capacity to contain divine mystery, 
sirr – secret - which mirrors the idea of the Sufic Real and the Lacanian real in that it 
cannot be grasped.  
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One of the great Sufis, Ibn Arabi (d. 1240), claims that there are three layers to the 
study of the spiritual sciences: the first is reason, the second is experience of the 
spiritual states beyond reason and the third, the science of the mysteries (asrar), 
goes even beyond the first two (Chittick 1989). Ibn Arabi also describes sirr as the 
point between the human and the divine at which God addresses the person 
(Chittick 1989) (this term is not to be confused with sihr, which means sorcery). Sirr 
is sometimes described as one aspect of the laitaf (stations) a series of internal way 
points, associated with sites on the body and corresponding concepts and symbolic 
colours that lead the Sufi towards the divine. There are different ways of classifying 
the gradations of the laitaf at this level (Nurbakhsh 1992), so I will refer to sirr as a 
blanket term for these concealed aspects on the understanding that some Sufic 
sources may sub-categorise this principle. Frager (1999) focuses on the concept of 
refining the nafs, but still acknowledges the importance of an inner domain of the 
heart that lies beyond their influence. The key point is that there is an element of the 
divine within the human which is unknown to them and the locus of attention for 
these stations is the heart. Ibn Arabi wrote: “The Real has chosen out for Himself 
from you only your heart, since He illumined it with faith, and it encompasses the 
majesty of the Real” (Chittick 1989, p. 245). While there are various stations, it is 
those that are hidden from the individual which are of interest here. This 
concealment is different from standard notions of the unconscious, as Benslama 
states: “Ibn Arabi’s unconscious is not the Freudian unconscious, even if it often 
comes close to it. It is the condition of the spiritual veiling and unveiling of the 
multiple forms of man” (2009, p. 31). Chittick clarifies Ibn Arabi’s doctrine on this 
matter: “God does not really place anything behind a curtain, but our ignorance 
prevents us from seeing the realities as they are in themselves” (1989, p. 105).  
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The subject of this esoteric position is similar to the Lacanian subject who is barred 
through incompleteness, an inability to fully be oneself. But for the esoteric subject, 
there is a locus to this absence. If there is a part of our mind-body relationship that is 
associated with esoteric subjectivity, then it is the heart – a symbol that can be 
interpreted in different ways. The heart is a useful symbol for the esoteric because it 
is not linked to cognition – it circumvents a dialogue centred on the brain. The heart 
is often referred to as a site of direct experience of something that cannot be 
articulated and this occurs in different traditions and across different cultures at 
different times.  
 
Sufis emphasise the abstract symbolism of the heart, a feature shared with other 
spiritual traditions: the ancient Greeks saw the heart as a source of intellect, the 
Egyptian mythology of the afterlife has the heart weighed to assess the actions of the 
deceased. Jaynes (1976), in his theory of the way that the relationship between the 
brain hemispheres has shaped culture, acknowledges the importance of the thumos, 
located in the chest as a source of knowledge for the ancient Greeks, even though 
his premise about the relationship between brain hemispheres differs from 
McGilchrist (2009). The heart is one of several focal points for meditation in 
Hinduism while Roman Catholicism has the devotion of the Sacred Heart. The 
sixteenth century mystic Teresa of Avila (1995) had the sensation of her heart being 
speared during a mystical vision. Julian of Norwich (d. 1416) uses similar descriptors 
to the Sufis when she states that a spiritual eye was opened which enabled her to 
see the soul within the heart (1920). The Sufi Al Ghazali (d. 1111) describes God 
placing light in his chest (2006) and Surah 94 of the Quran refers to comfort or 
93 
 
expansion of the heart or breast, depending on how the Arabic term is translated. As 
a symbol, the heart is truly mystical: we cannot divulge anything further beyond the 
hints given from the literature. It symbolises something which is deeply subjective, 
yet remains a common point of great significance to mystical traditions. It is also 
important in Blake’s cosmology. In Jerusalem Blake includes lines such as: “I look 
into thy bosom, I discover thy secret places” (Blake and Stevenson 2007 p. 702). In 
the Four Zoas, one of the works that features Urizen, one of the characters is 
instructed to look within at the gates of their broken Heart to find the Lamb of God 
(Quinney p. 120).    
 
As described in Chapter 7.3, Žižek privileges Christianity over Gnosticism because 
the former calls for reinvention while the latter asks for reunification with the divine. 
But some esoteric traditions based around the heart see it as a site that remains 
open. Although sirr is associated with the heart, in Islam the heart itself is also a 
contested site. One of the Hadith describes the heart being blown about like a 
feather in a desert breeze (Ibn Majah 2012). In another, Mohammed is reported to 
have said that the hearts of everyone are “between the two fingers of the Merciful as 
one heart. He directs them wherever he wills” (Muslim 2011). The Arabic word for 
heart – qalb – is derived from the same root as the word for revolution (Nurbakhsh 
1992). There are differences between Islamic mysticism and New Age thinking. 
Unlike the New Age meditator seeking an emptiness inside themselves, the esoteric 
subject in this case is left torn open and unable to fully cohere, but is also open to 
reinvention.  
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Sirr is not something that a human controls, another aspect which makes it 
anathema to Urizen. This sense of desertion, of the person not being in control of 
what they are accessing from the divine, is regarded by Sufis as a teaching point 
anyway. Mohammed experienced a two-year hiatus in revelations and Sufi poetry 
frequently references separation and longing. On a practical level, Al Ghazali (2006) 
described his own crisis when God took away his ability to speak, the skill which had 
made his worldly reputation as a leading academic and advisor. The message in 
Sufism is that everything by which a human measures themselves can be taken in 
an instant. It is difficult to attempt to package these concepts as an overarching 
method other than a form of self-cultivation that allows room for something new to 
enter. The position of an esoteric subject under these conditions is something far 
more tenuous than the type of Gnostic position of which Žižek is critical. The 
situation I am describing is one of an individual unable to rest in the certainty of 
eventual closure, something that corresponds with Žižek’s position as an atheist. For 
Žižek, “everything that is, is material, but materiality itself is non-all, inherently 
incomplete, failed” (Rose 2017, p. 252; italics in the original). I will also discuss the 
idea of non-closure further in the context of Karbala, the battle which left the Shia in 
a ruptured world in which they are fated “never to succeed” (Dabashi 2011, p. 81). 
 
8.2: A Subject Shaped by a Different Experience 
The concept of an esoteric subject does not rely on a belief in a certain faith. It can 
accommodate secularism and atheism. Rose describes how “a crucial mutation took 
place somewhere between Descartes and Kant” (2017, p. 250) through which 
philosophical enquiry switched from concern about the relation between God and 
creation to questions about whether the subject could ever know the world. This “re-
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centring around the individual subject, made possible the re-emergence of mystical 
theology” (Rose 2017, p. 250). For Lacan, “the true formula of atheism is not God is 
dead – even by basing the origin of the function of the father upon his murder, Freud 
protects the father – the true formula of atheism is God is unconscious” (Lacan 1998, 
p. 59; italics in the original).  Žižek (2013) reminds us that there is a “difference 
between ‘God is unconscious’ and ‘God is THE unconscious’, that the idea of God 
informs our practices without our awareness, that ‘we act AS IF we believe’” (Žižek 
2013, unpaginated). Regarding Lacan’s secularism, Beattie observes: “Whether 
Lacan’s desire ever did find release from the absent God of his Catholic faith is open 
to debate, but his flight led him along a winding atheological path which is more 
critical of modern scientific atheism than it is of religion” (Beattie 2016, p. 60). 
 
The nature of the subject, their self-perception mirrored by society and by their own 
reflective processes, is a key to what can be called wellbeing but the implications of 
that subjectivity run deeper than just wellbeing itself. The idea of an esoteric 
subjectivity derives from my earlier projects (Hanson 2014a, 2015) which looked at 
the problems with the current healthcare ideology and ideas with the potential to 
offer an alternative perspective. As a tradition that has elements of esoteric doctrine, 
there are many concepts that can be included within the descriptor of Islam, such 
that it acts as a quilting point (Sayyid 1997). Islam has a shifting identity as a term, 
especially at the point where it meets Western liberalism (Massad 2009). Rodinson 
describes how, in its formative years after the revelation,  
 
the group had not yet acquired a name. Its members could only call 
themselves the faithful (mu'min in the singular) and, probably not until a 
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good deal later, those who had surrendered (muslim, or moslem) to Allah. 
But these qualities did not necessarily apply to them alone. In particular, 
the same words were used to describe those who had followed the call of 
the prophets of the past. There are no signs of a truly organized 
community (Rodinson 1985, p. 129).  
 
This is a community emerging from an encounter with the real, before Urizenic 
tropes can set in. 
 
In the Islamic tradition, Mohammed, like other human beings, has much in common 
with the Lacanian divided subject. The initial shock of revelation was traumatic, for its 
initial onset in the cave of Hijra was enough to make him contemplate suicide (Ishaq 
and Guillaume 1955/2004). Mohammed's situation steps even closer to Lacan’s 
ideas of division when we consider that he had to articulate through language what 
he experienced. He had to put into words a set of phenomena which, each time, left 
him feeling as if his soul would be torn from his body (Rogerson 2007). This 
resembles, albeit more viscerally, the Lacanian subject for whom words are 
inadequate and for whom there is knowledge that there is more to them than they 
can fully grasp. 
 
Whereas Lacan’s ideas are applicable to many as a psychological aspect of one’s 
encounter with society, the experience of revelation was unique to one individual and 
the death of the prophet left a rupture. Islam-as-master-signifier (Sayyid 1997) is also 
wrenched open by that trauma. If, as Rifkind and Picco (2014) suggest, a social 
body, a nation state or culture can be influenced by traumatic events just as an 
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individual is, to the degree that its leaders tend to emphasise the presence of an 
enemy and guide their followers to respond to events on the assumption that they 
are under threat, is it also possible for a religion to be traumatised? Dabashi posits a 
Karbala complex: the concepts of innocence and martyrdom formulated through “the 
post-traumatic stress syndrome of the Battle of Karbala” (2011, p. 80). Feldman 
(2012), growing up in a strict Hasidic sect, describes a community with rules derived 
from the trauma of the Holocaust, which absorbed anti-Semitic concepts, such as 
believing that the group was deserving of persecution, in order to rationalise those 
events and to imbue the group with a special status in their relationship to God. As a 
comparison, the geographic sites of Blackbird Field (the site of the defeat of Serbian 
forces by the Ottomans in 1389) and Karbala are of psychological significance for 
the Serbians and for the Shia respectively; each of these people (the Jews of Israel, 
the Orthodox Christians of Serbia and the Shia of the Middle East) have a focal point 
of a religion and geography associated with those emotionally charged events. The 
legacy of these events binds the community in the manner of Reddy’s (2001) ideas 
of emotives: the words themselves are emotionally charged and directly linked to 
sets of cultural practices including ritual, narratives and symbolic art. The 
overwhelming sensations felt by Mohammed when first confronted by a vision in the 
cave at Hijra and the soul-tearing subsequent revelations were experienced by a 
mortal who, we are informed, was chosen as a messenger because he was similar 
to the rest of his community. It was his ordinariness which led some to reject him 
because they saw no special reason why he should be a messenger. As with the 
archetypal Lacanian subject, an ordinary person has to cope with the extraordinary 
process of their identity and the real, even without exposure to a truth event.  
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There are first-hand accounts of esoteric knowledge being embraced by people with 
backgrounds which are not only secular but also scientific, criteria which might 
otherwise be expected to conflict with their unusual personal experiences.  John 
Wren-Lewis, an atheist who recovered from a life-threatening poisoning in 1983 
describes his mystic experience as accessing the Dazzling Dark.  
 
 My impression is that my personal consciousness was actually snuffed 
out (the root meaning, according to some scholars, of the word nirvana) 
and then recreated by a kind of focusing-down from the infinite eternity of 
that radiant dark pure consciousness … Moreover that wonderful eternal 
life of everywhere was still there, right behind my eyes or more accurately, 
at the back of my head continually recreating my whole personal body-
mind consciousness afresh, instant by instant, now! and now! and now! 
That’s no mere metaphor for a vague sensation; it was so palpably real 
that I put my hand up to probe the back of my skull, half wondering if the 
doctors had sawn part of it away to open my head to infinity. Yet it wasn’t 
in the least a feeling of being damaged; it was more like having had a 
cataract taken off my brain, letting me experience the world and myself 
properly for the first time for that lovely dark radiance seemed to reveal 
the essence of everything as holy (Wren-Lewis n.d., unpaginated). 
 
These experiences bear some similarity to those of the neuroscientist Jill Bolte 
Taylor (2009) whose left hemisphere stroke changed the way that she applied her 
awareness to the world around her.  
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According to Quinney, Blake and Kant share the belief that people can “possess 
themselves of an unassailable transcendental agency” (Quinney 2009, p. 99) which 
can rescue them from helplessness. What Blake promotes is “not the recovery of an 
empirical agency (which was never possessed) but the discovery of agency of 
another kind” (Quinney 2009, p. 98; italics in the original). The esoteric can be 
chosen over the empiricism that Urizen represents. This is the same type of 
reinvention that Žižek (2001) sees in Christianity, as described in Chapter 7.3. The 
esoteric subject is one who cultivates an attitude of being open to the real for the 
rare occasions when its unplanned intrusion into the symbolic radically alters the 
individual’s world. They are able to respond to a call to become something inspired 
by the real in a manner similar to the ways described by Ruti (2012), whose 
approach is based on Lacanian theory. Ruti draws on Badiou’s (2005) concept of the 
event and Žižek’s (2009b) ideas about the act of subjective destitution to describe 
the importance of critical moments that define the subject in their relationship to the 
prevailing order. I have already used the experiences of the mathematician John 
Wren-Lewis and the neuroscientist Jill Bolte Taylor as examples from fields normally 
associated with mainstream thinking. Wren-Lewis describes the type of condition 
that must be overcome and in doing so, he shows that what is required is more than 
a psychological method.    
 
The hypothesis I’ve come up with is that the block which cuts off so-called 
normal human consciousness from its roots in that other, impersonal 
consciousness, is some kind of inflation or hyperactivity of the 
psychological survival-system. Exactly how or when this originated in the 
history of our species I have no idea, and at present don’t propose to 
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speculate. But the effect of this hyper-defensiveness is to focus individual 
consciousness so rigidly on the business of securing its own future that 
the underlying universal consciousness, with its every-present-moment 
happiness, peace and wonder, gets shut out (Wren-Lewis 1994, 
unpaginated).  
 
Wren-Lewis also expresses his unusual mental state another way. He describes how 
on emerging from the poisoning which nearly killed him: “My feeling was much more 
like that of having been suddenly and instantaneously cured of something akin to a 
brain cataract that had obscured my perceptions for as long as I could remember” 
(2004, p. 2). These accounts appear to bear out the lived experience of McGilchrist’s 
description that “left hemisphere superiority is based, not on a leap forward of the left 
hemisphere, but on a ‘deliberate’ handicapping of the right” (2009, p. 132) but they 
hint at something deeper because while Bolte Taylor’s left hemisphere stroke 
impeded her ability to function in the world (Bolte Taylor 2009), Wren-Lewis does not 
report any such impediment – he was able to manipulate the world around him while 
still experiencing a newly discovered state of mind which appears to have lasted for 
the rest of his life.  
 
I am not suggesting that the epiphanic experiences above are specifically right 
hemisphere ones, nor am I suggesting that hemispheric differences are the way to 
approach the idea of an esoteric subjectivity. McGilchrist (2009) advocates a co-
operation between the approaches exemplified by the right and left sides of the brain 
and stresses that all parts of the brain are involved in some way with every activity.  
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8.3: Karbala, Rupture and Decline   
In 680 AD, an internal divide over the succession to Mohammed culminated in a 
massacre at Karbala, an event of spiritual and emotional significance to Shia 
Muslims in the modern era.  
  
Encounters with the real can bring disruption and failure in the material realm. The 
symbolic order re-closes the gap while the subjects created by the event are altered 
and change the co-ordinates of their immediate social surroundings (Ruti 2012). 
Karbala represents a prophylactic to Žižek's (2012c) warning that what appears to be 
revolutionary fails as it becomes structured. The esotericism of Islam was elided 
from the dominant Islamic narrative, a process which Hussain (1988) sees as eternal 
and something that becomes replicated on the internal plane in the form of an 
individual’s struggle against their nafs.  
 
If the revolution already comes with a state of disturbance, there is a continuous 
invitation to change. The emotional significance of Karbala has kept the rupture 
open. Extremism is the Urizenic attempt to artificially seal this process and introduce 
stasis.  
 
The Urizenic subject compensates for an absence of holistic meaning by filling their 
world with piecemeal signifiers. McGilchrist provides us with the themes, such as 
novelty and abstraction, that this mindset adopts. The esoteric subject recognises 
the void within their view of the whole and accepts the separation they feel from an 
ideal, whether that means the Sufi's separation from God, the Lacanian self-division, 
or the acknowledgement by both of their sense of the real. As mentioned in Chapter 
7.3, Žižek (2001) sees a distinction between Gnosticism’s search for reunion with the 
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divine and Christianity’s call for a person’s reinvention. But the legacy of Karbala 
introduces a rupture rather than a Gnostic return.  
Karbala can represent open possibility, a rupture that is kept open through ritual and 
iconography by the communities that live with its legacy, without hope of arriving at a 
conclusion (Flaskerud 2012). It is an acceptance of failure (Dabashi 2011). The 
acceptance of an open rupture becomes even more striking if one considers the way 
it is alluded to as an act of destiny. Karbala has been captured in the Shia cultural 
memory as 
 
a predestined divine plan, with the mythologized notion of the 
protagonists’ willingness to die. They become part of God’s plan by, on 
the one hand, being predestined to do so and, on the other hand, by 
willingly choosing to participate in the plan (Flaskerud 2012, p. 118).  
 
Dabashi (2011) sees parallels between the shared sense of sacrifice experienced by 
both Shias and Christians.  
 
Karbala is an example of a response that can thwart an Urizenic programme. 
Rodinson’s description of these events points to the same idea – that of a 
revolutionary ideal failing on one level but also realising its potential in unexpected 
ways. Speaking of the victors at the Battle of Karbala (680 AD) he writes:  
 
At the head of this empire was the family of Quraysh, which had been the 
most determined in its opposition to the Prophet - the family of Abu 
Sufyan, the Umayyads. Its finest administrator was Mu'awiya, the son of 
Abu Sufyan and also of Hind, the woman whose hysterical hatred of Islam 
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was such that on the night after Uhud she had torn out and eaten the liver 
of the Prophet's uncle Hamza, the lion of Allah. It was as if Muhammad 
had worked and preached all for the greater glory and profit of his 
enemies. He had conquered an empire for those who had rejected him, 
the Quraysh. A not uncommon outcome of revolutions. But ideas have a 
life of their own and that life, too, is revolutionary (Rodinson 1985, p. 295). 
 
At the point of failure, the revolution can take on a life of its own and instigate forms 
of renewal that cannot be foreseen – a situation similar to the process of renewal 
that Žižek (1997) sees as the important legacy of Christianity. Urizen can materially 
crush what it sees as the external representation of the esoteric but its blind spot is 
that of the left hemisphere which discounts the possibility that it may have missing 
information (McGilchrist 2009). In its blunt response to what it did not understand, it 
produced an emotionally charged event that propelled the esoteric element forward.   
 
In rational terms, the stand against superior forces at Karbala had no logic to it. But 
as an emotive event, it side-stepped the difficulty of a spiritual practice degenerating 
once it becomes the master signifier. Žižek (2012c) regards the figurative day after 
the revolution as a crucial moment where an emancipatory project teeters on the 
brink of failure through loss of momentum or misappropriation. Karbala inserted an 
indelible mark by deliberate self-destruction in a way that carried immense symbolic 
weight, something of the order of an act of subjective destitution where the individual 
is compelled by a motivation that possesses its own internal logic (Žižek 2014b). 
Lewis Mumford believed that Jesus, Buddha, Mohammed and the traditions they 
“fostered eventually broke the magico-religious spell of the megamachine” (Miller 
1989, p. 524) – the latter being his term for centralised power based on technology.  
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As an act of subjective destitution, Karbala allowed a Lacanian metaphysical 
approach to unfold because it prevented the complete closure of the Islamic project 
around a single master signifier.  
 
The followers of a spiritual tradition attempt to re-connect to something that went 
before but is now lost. A lost ideal can sustain an ideology (Žižek 1989). But there 
are two features of Islam’s past which are of interest here: the idea of Karbala as an 
open rupture, and Mohammed’s own indications of how Islam would change radically 
in the generations after his death as laid out in the hadith: “Islam began as 
something strange and will go back to being strange, so glad tidings to the strangers” 
(Ibn Majah 2013). Žižek has rightly criticised New Age detachment as well as the 
manipulation of a lost or promised ideal to maintain an ideology. There are various 
examples of hadith in which Mohammed predicted the decay of the tradition after his 
death (Kabbani 2003; Al Areefi 2010). The predictions of degeneration and the open 
wound of Karbala are aspects built into the system that appear to resist the normal 
frameworks supporting ideological closure.  
 
As an alternative to using the lost ideal as a prop for ideology, the esoteric path can 
recognise limitations or even failure in the external world, as with courtly love or the 
Lacanian drive. The individual will be left incomplete, open, as with the Sufic idea of 
baz - to be torn open. Unlike Žižek’s view of the gnostic, this is a system founded not 
on anticipated reunification but on rupture in the present.    
 
Externally with Karbala, internally with baz, we have the wrenching of the symbolic to 
produce a permanently open context, a wound that will not heal and is not intended 
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to.  The liberal tradition as formulated in the West discourages this esoteric escape 
route because it cannot be examined under a positivist rubric: Urizen attempts to 
suture all openings. 
  
8.4: Islam as a Contested Signifier 
A challenge for a spiritual tradition in the present is that the material world attempts 
to co-opt the external markers designed to guide internal change. Since 2012, 
Pilgrims to Mecca have been able to pay for a stay in the Abraj al Bait hotel which 
towers nearly two thousand feet over the Kaaba, negating the sense of equality that 
is shown when a community in prayer prostrate themselves equally and not by social 
rank. Irfan Al-Alawi, director of the Islamic Heritage Research Foundation, reports 
that people sometimes pray in the wrong direction because the scale of luxury 
accommodation and exclusive shops (built at the cost of destruction of local 
heritage) means that they are confused about where the mosque is (Wainwright 
2015). (Appendix Two shows an example of the hotel towering above the sites of 
spiritual significance.)  
 
But the markers of dogma, such as the rote transmission of ritual, cannot be 
dispensed with because, used in a certain way, they have a role to play. The prayer 
uttered into the Muslim child's ear at birth is an inscribing into the symbolic order 
before they are capable of a response to it. Even if, cognitively, there is no way for 
the child's brain to meaningfully interpret the sounds, the fact that the event has 
occurred remains. This has commonality with other rituals in other spiritual traditions. 
Those who witness it will generate meaning in their own way. Žižek (1989) describes 
the ideological process occurring through practice, that by repeating the words and 
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gestures people come to believe that they believe, and such practices correspond 
with what Reddy (2001) sees as elements of his emotives. The prayer that is never 
understood by the newborn who hears it can carry a seed that possesses the 
potential to trump Urizen as a form of delayed interpellation. The subject is hailed by 
a whisper in the ear but does not respond immediately; it eventually learns the 
significance of the event that occurred and can respond. A set of conditions similar to 
Heidegger’s (1996) concept of Lichtung (the clearing) has been established for the 
person to discover. Looked at another way, the child catching up with a realisation of 
being marked is similar to Lacan’s (2006) subject of the mirror stage: it realises that 
there is a version of itself that has been awaiting recognition. In thus being inscribed 
into one symbolic order, the subject is conditioned to a degree against subsequent 
attempts at interpellation because the ideological apparatuses have to work against 
a structure that precedes them. Sacred spaces in contested sites linked to Judaism 
and Islam are policed because the religious authorities fear the subversive power of 
silent prayer: “One who walks this sacred space evoking any suspicion of silent 
secret prayer is interrogated by security, both official and self-appointed” (Podmore 
2017, p. 206).   
 
Althusser (1971) warns that ideology runs deeper than the material presence of the 
ISAs, that when hailed our response is a recognition that we have already been 
interpellated. From the perspective of McGilchrist and Tweedy, the Urizenic function 
I have been describing has been present as part of our development from birth. The 
seed of the pre-interpellation fails to grow if the Muslim-by-birth takes these elements 
at face value, to incorporate them into the Urizenic view of the self and distort them, 
to become an unMuslim, one who, in the manner of the fictional undead, 
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masquerades the principles as a superficial construct of dogma. Žižek (2003b) 
describes this category of the undead as manifesting the true meaning of the death 
drive: a mindless continuation of life without the creative. It is a Thing that looks and 
acts like those around it but is not one of them.   
 
8.5: The Esoteric in Urizenic Times 
The interface between the human and what they perceive as beyond themselves is 
the problematic marginal space that Douglas (2001) identified as separate from the 
mainstream of a community but also necessary at certain times, performing rites that 
are both reassuring and threatening. In his study of the mystic, Podmore, is “mindful 
of the scandal and threat (even offense) the secret of such interiority poses to 
exteriority” (Podmore 2017, p. 198; italics in the original). As Derrida (1981) 
proposed with the idea of pharmakon, the medium of transmission can be potentially 
healing or lethal – as was the case with the climate of tribal conflict in which a 
religion promoting peace as an ideal found itself in seventh century Arabia. 
Paradoxes would be an inevitable consequence of the symbolic order's inability to 
articulate the real. The right hemisphere thinking style can tolerate difference but if 
we are in an epoch marked by the values of Urizen, then the religious ideals will be 
valued for their capacity to be misused rather than for their original esoteric worth. 
Almond (2004) sees a relationship between Derrida and the Sufi Ibn Arabi in their 
suspicion towards rational attempts to understand the true meaning behind a 
process, whether it is a text for the former or the divine for the latter.    
 
The compromise between an esoteric approach and the spiritual form of leadership 
traditionally used to manifest it carries a risk of being misread, such as with 
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Foucault's (1978) misplaced optimism about the ultimate outcome of the Khomeini 
revolution in Iran. Something that evokes an esoteric ideal can fall foul of Urizen 
once it has power.  
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Chapter 9: What Is To Be Done? 
In this chapter I will examine how the issues that I have covered in preceding 
chapters can be applied to healthcare policy. The innovations I am proposing are 
unlikely to be welcomed by Urizen. McGilchrist (2009) is careful to repeatedly state 
that both thinking styles are required, the holism of the right and the parsing of the 
left, even though the left hemisphere does not realise this and sees attenuation of its 
influence as a threat.  
 
It is possible to resist Urizenic tendencies. McGilchrist (2009) describes points in 
time where certain cultural movements, such as Romanticism, were able to emerge 
and how even outside of those periods, a minority of artists were still able to 
generate new ways of thinking from within a culture dominated by the sort of 
problems I have explored above. A response based on this viewpoint of the 
relationship between neurology and culture would resist Urizen by maintaining 
practices that preserve an alternative perspective until the cycle of cultural change 
once again permits the expansion of such ideas. In Blake’s (1797) cosmology, there 
is a reconciliation when Urizen realises the damage he has caused and begins to 
work in harmony with the other figures included in his myth, not forgetting that these 
figures, including that of Urizen, represent emanations of the psyche. A response to 
Urizen based on the ideas of McGilchrist and Blake would be relatively passive. 
 
I have been using Žižek’s ideas to explore the social setting for McGilchrist’s theory 
and it is at this point of resistance that we can observe a difference in their 
responses. Žižek (2011a, 2016) addresses pressing, global issues such as financial 
collapse and mass migration, matters which I see as closely linked to Urizenic 
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mindset that originates from McGilchrist’s initial idea and Žižek’s approach to 
solutions is more radical. Žižek (2016) speaks of breaking out of social deadlocks via 
a common struggle.  
 
Currently, the response to healthcare ideologies which I will describe cannot be 
adopted within mainstream healthcare programmes because it is of the margins, an 
ambiguous space that can be both hostile and vulnerable (Douglas (2001): 
threatening to the staid view of emotional wellbeing within the NHS but also 
threatened by it through denial of funding. Whereas Urizen requires certainty and 
stability in order to measure and control, I advocate a response to Urizen that 
permits openness and uncertainty.  
 
9.1: Re-thinking the Patient/System Relationship 
One step towards changing healthcare policy would be to alter the relationship 
between the individual entering the health system and the system itself. Earlier, I 
referred to the work of Ruti (2012) who, drawing on Badiou’s (2005) idea of the event 
and Žižek’s (2009b) view of the act, stresses the importance of critical moments that 
can shape someone and give them the opportunity to reappraise their subjectivity. I 
propose an approach to wellbeing which would help the subject within the healthcare 
system to cultivate their capacity to respond to an event when it occurs. Instead of 
attempting to cure the person within the limits of the system, the healthcare services 
would prepare people to challenge the ideological processes that have contributed to 
their problems.  
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The esoteric subject will have a different relationship to the healthcare ideology, 
unlike the subject created by IAPT, a mythical creature which exists in neutral space 
and for whom it claims to be beneficent. For under that mythology, if the idealised 
healthcare subject can access IAPT, they will be treated for the ills generated by the 
system that is treating them; they will become – in the eyes of that system - an 
improved version of the subject already interpellated by the institutions that founded 
the health structure. The esoteric subject is oriented towards the unknown – they 
keep open the possibility of something beyond the conformity demanded by IAPT.   
 
A therapeutic system which factors in the failings of the surrounding social order has 
implications for the therapist as well as the patient. The patient would not just be 
encouraged by the therapist to become well enough (as defined by certain metrics 
that predefine wellness) to resume their place in the social structure – this is the 
thinking behind IAPT (Layard et al. 2006). Instead, both parties would be preparing 
for an event that challenges them in an extreme way but which has the potential to 
radically alter the co-ordinates of their being and how they relate to their social order.  
 
To attempt to prescribe the exact circumstances of an event and the response to it 
would be to create a false truth event, and Zupancic (2011) warns that attempts to 
artificially induce such moments lead to tyranny. IAPT is an artificially imposed 
masquerade of an event. But alterations could be made to healthcare delivery which 
would make the patient, the therapist and the system more open to radical change.     
 
Under Urizenic conditions, the therapist is alienated from the results of their work. 
The IAPT coup has created a new form of indentured worker: people trained to 
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deliver therapy a certain way and needing continued employment within that narrow 
field in order to live. They can rebel to a limited degree, but, after Bhabha (1994), it is 
the sly civility of someone caught within a system who is covertly doing what they 
can to make the performance metrics work despite the rules placed upon them. 
Instead of this, what we may aim for as an effective strategy can be informed by 
other disciplines, in keeping with McGilchrist’s advocating of a holistic approach. 
IAPT is based on reproduction, not preparation for the unique moment of potentially 
radical change. The esoteric subject, whether a patient or a clinician, is one that 
recreates and prepares themselves. This reinvention is closer to the value that Žižek 
sees in Christianity but which I do not see as unique to that tradition. In the next 
chapters I will explore what might open up the possibility of change.   
 
9.2: A Wellbeing Policy that Challenges the Social Order 
One of the implications of the changes that I am proposing would be a direct 
correlation between psycho-social treatment and the challenging of the ideologies 
which have played a part in the distress of the patient. Soler (2016) believes that 
more attention is placed on depression above many other mental health conditions 
because those individuals withdraw from the production process. She sees anguish 
as capitalism’s true emotional disorder, an affect she sees as being tied to subjective 
destitution but also one that does not place a great cost on the productive processes 
and may even stimulate them.  
 
The idea of embracing the real runs counter to the prevailing attitude which favours 
an emotional homogeneity so that psychological reactions can be policed. The stress 
that is caused or exacerbated by the dominant social system is treated as a 
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psychological matter for the individual and not as a signal that the system itself 
should address its shortcomings.  
 
9.3: Accommodating the System’s Limits 
The narrative around the delivery of psycho-social care would also be changed. The 
investment of money and reputation require IAPT to succeed at any cost, including 
alteration of targets so that it is never seen to fail (Dormon 2015). A rupture of the 
current arrangement would entail a realstic acknowledgment of the limits of 
psychological treatments. The possibility of failure has to be recognised in order for 
the metrics to reflect reality. My proposed response will also require a spirit of 
enquiry different from that which is fostered today. Critical theory has maintained its 
link to psychoanalytic ideas but this form of connection between the sociological and 
the psychological was lost with the turn to behaviourism. With CBT there is no critical 
enquiry into the surrounding culture and the sociological setting of CBT is regarded 
as an ideologically free neutral space. There might be any number of variables 
beyond the psychological but the Urizenic mindset present within the current 
healthcare system fails to recognise what does not fit its worldview. There is no 
space for an exploration of society or ideology in a CBT session. Clement’s (2015) 
criticism of the early development of psychoanalysis as a clinical practice, before it 
assumed its place in cultural studies and critical theory (that it was a treatment 
process undertaken for spectators who would marvel at the cure), can be also be 
applied to IAPT: a sweeping gesture to make onlookers gasp at its apparently 
miraculous effects. Psychoanalysis was able to offer ideas that provided depth and 
meaning to other areas, such as art, literature, film and the humanities within its host 
culture, but the same cannot be said of IAPT. To be truly effective at resolving 
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problems that are systemic within the culture, the treatment has to apply across 
different fields, including the non-psychological. The IAPT system has not made the 
leap from clinical spectator performance to something potentially subversive that 
Clement (2015) describes of its predecessor.   
 
Money is also a factor when discussing models of treatment that deal with uncertain 
psycho-social factors, for it is hard to engineer them as a source of wealth 
generation because they are amorphous and subject to the specific conditions of a 
therapy session. There would be no trademarked unique selling point to which 
access could be controlled and sold. 
 
Instead of the current model, which assumes a coherent subject acting rationally, a 
system that recognised rupture would understand its manifestation at different levels: 
the inherent self-division of the patient, the clinician and the healthcare 
organisations. Just as with those esoteric practices that recognise an 
incompleteness, the individuals and the structure would acknowledge and embrace 
points of failure that reveal the truth of a situation. Data would not be manipulated to 
present a false image. The metrics used to monitor would not be used to punish 
(National IAPT Programme Team 2012) underperforming bodies which were 
showing their failures. Programmes such as IAPT would be permitted to fail because 
the difficulties of the social system underpinning the mental health problems, the 
Urizenic tendencies in institutions and across society, would be recognised as an 
important contributory factor. There would also be an understanding that someone 
who is at odds with an Urizenic system, someone who feels unable to find self-
coherence in it, is revealing the deficits of that system as well as maintaining the 
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potential for change. Differences to the system could be fostered in the hope that 
they may provide a solution which is beyond the scope of that system. McGilchrist 
does not prescribe specific responses to the ideology he describes, but he does 
state that change “would require a willingness to accept being seen as naïve for not 
getting caught up in the dialectic of the clever ironies, on the one hand, or of 
scientific materialism, on the other” (2009, p. 450).  Žižek (2016, 2017) warns that 
the current global pressures on nation states, such as economic collapse, refugee 
movement and racism, are too great for any single group of politicians to solve 
alone. Institutions basing policy on a limited perspective and acting too closely within 
their own confines will not be capable of responding to increasingly complex social 
demands.     
 
A healthcare model which truly recognised its own inherent inadequacies would 
diverge from the model of distress and its cure propounded by Layard et al. (2006) 
by seeing the individual as mattering more than the psychological methodology 
purporting to cure them. An effective therapy model under my proposals would 
accommodate what Frank and Frank (1991) see as the rituals that the person would 
readily engage in and the rationale they give themselves for doing so. This process 
identified by Frank (1974) correlates with Žižek’s work on ideology as they both 
examine the processes shaping someone as a subject. According to Douglas (2001), 
ritual does not have to be a secondary process; there are some things that cannot be 
experienced without ritual and the language uttered creates thoughts that would not 
have been the same otherwise. Frank’s (1974) ideas of correlation to ritual and the 
common factors approach derived from ideas first put forward by Rosenzweig (1936) 
are unlikely to be adopted widely because they do not lend themselves to the 
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monocular approach that Urizenic healthcare systems find easier to organise. Under 
my proposals, the subject’s relationship with the symbolic order would be seen as a 
factor in distress and healing. 
 
9.4: Embracing the Marginal 
A structure that recognised the neglected area of the esoteric would tacitly accept 
the influence of what it does not know and would be more accommodating of the 
marginal spaces which are unacknowledged but exert an influence, the pressure 
points that can erupt as a passage a l’acte for want of expression through other 
means, eruptions that can be misinterpreted by mainstream institutions. Žižek (2009) 
saw the 2005 riots in the Parisian banlieues as well as those in London in 2011 
(Žižek 2011) as examples of the passage a l'acte and he highlighted the lack of 
understanding among social commentators who attempted to impose a meaning on 
them rather than acknowledge the absence of one. The practical effect of my 
approach to psycho-social care will be to include those clients who occupy the 
marginal spaces. These are the clients who, because they do not fit easily within the 
pre-arranged treatment pathways provided for them, fulfill a role akin to that of 
Agamben’s (1995) Homo Sacer. These clients possess a mixed identity of those who 
need help but who do not meet the criteria demanded of them, they are marginalised 
and have to accept treatment on terms which are not their own or else be excluded 
from treatment entirely. Someone’s anger at an unfair system that disadvantages 
them can be pathologised as a psychological problem about their inability to regulate 
their emotions. Under my proposals, the system would recognise the part played by 
the social structure itself in contributing to violent reactions and it would also 
consider its inability to formulate a response. Instead of classifying the subjects as 
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psychological patients, the system would seek to alter how it classifies people and 
accept that it may have no way of accommodating a new social phenomenon. 
Complex social incidents are categorised by templates that take the existing 
healthcare architecture as fixed and as something to be accessed as a corrective 
outside of normal daily life. Organisations are funded to deliver services in a certain 
way based on the pre-existing structure that the patient finds themselves subject to. 
This inflexibility in doctrine and funding leads to the patient being treated as a 
product, as something that can be manipulated for profit. The patient is placed in a 
state of exception, that of Homo Sacer (Agamben 1995): someone demarcated to be 
treated in a certain way but unable to benefit from privileges that might correspond to 
their unique status. The patient who does not fit IAPT criteria is recognised as an 
individual with some form of diagnosis but with an altered status as a subject of the 
healthcare system. They are excluded from treatment in case they pollute the data 
sets by their inability to achieve a successful outcome from treatment and the system 
is structured so that this is permissible and acceptable. Embracing the marginal will 
mean an acceptance of low performance measures but also an understanding that 
they are reflecting the scale of the problem. I am proposing a system that accepts 
that its anticipated performance metrics might not succeed. This would require an 
acceptance of the weight of social factors that lie beyond the scope of psychological 
methods. The potential inadequacy of any intervention should be transparent and 
should not carry a penalty.  
 
There should be a greater recognition of societal factors such as debt on mental 
health (Stepchange Debt Charity 2013), which require something other than 
psychology for their alleviation. Recruitment into IAPT and training of its staff would 
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include expertise in other social science disciplines, even to the extent that there 
would be a preparedness to spend the bulk of the funding on, for example, social 
workers and teachers, if it was felt that investment should be focused on preventing 
cycles of social deprivation from affecting the next generations. For those who have 
already left school, the emphasis may be best placed on legal advisors, debt 
managers and probation officers. This re-direction of funds would be an acceptance 
that those entering the care system might have problems of a cyclical nature – that 
similar difficulties can cross generations and that without significant social change, 
the problems may never be fully resolved but fluctuate in severity. This view 
contrasts with IAPT’s perceived linearity, which sees the population as self-
actualising through psychological techniques. The difference is between a system 
that accepts that it has failed to reduce recurring inequalities and one that aims to 
conceal those failings by classifying the problems as psychological. Urizen regards 
those within its population who are experiencing emotional difficulty as faulty 
mechanisms, straying from their original design of linear improvement through 
upwards social mobility. This thinking fails to account for their unchanged social 
circumstances or the human propensity for disavowal, to repeat harmful behavior in 
spite of oneself: the Lacanian formula of Je sais bien, mais quand mȇme… (Mannoni 
1968). Urizen will not acknowledge that people can act against their best interests 
and that they do not always reason. The provision of mental health services could 
take on the role of an inoculation to prevent the cycles repeating. There could be a 
critical appraisal of the reasons for distress that result from the surrounding social 
system, even if that includes the one responsible for delivering healthcare.   
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The idea of embracing the marginal does not only apply to patients. Although these 
social factors might have a psychological effect, there would be an understanding 
that the answer to psychological distress does not necessarily lie in psychology. The 
funding for IAPT services would be available to non-psychological disciplines. Our 
healthcare service should aim to develop individuals, both patients and clinicians, to 
make choices that the system will find unacceptable. If it is to become innovative 
enough to face the social difficulties that Žižek (2016, 2017) warns are beyond the 
scope of any single government programme, the health system needs to permit the 
intrusion of the real through ideas and practices that might threaten the current social 
framework.  
 
I interpret the delivery of a homogenised therapeutic process under IAPT as a 
perceived restoration of order out of the danger of marginality. The marginal is 
unwanted by the hegemony, but I see it as a source of true transformation. The IAPT 
programme follows a ritual, even if it is unreflexive about what it is, but ignores the 
origin of any transformative elements in its structure. Even if a client has a 
successful outcome in terms of how it is measured by IAPT, the question of 
transformation is not substantially answered beyond the claims that IAPT makes for 
itself. As the aim of IAPT is to get the unwell back into their jobs, one can argue that 
it is against meaningful transformation. It would rather people just got back to doing 
what they did before. The possibility of change at the level of the individual is 
connected to the wider society but with far more subtlety than that envisaged by the 
planners of IAPT.  
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9.5: Firebreak 
Rather than target the current adult population only to repeat the problems in a few 
years, the psycho-social care system could consider focusing on the upcoming 
generations. Those that will benefit have not been born yet. But no politician in an 
Urizenic system would invest in something that would not provide a return within the 
lifespan of their career. 
 
A problem for a mental health strategy built on adjusting cognitions or changing 
behaviours is the idea that our resilience develops over time, based on early life 
experiences. Policies based on lifelong development reformulate psychological 
problems in the present as social problems spanning generations. A study of Danish 
veterans of Afghanistan (Bernsten et al. 2012) indicated that trauma symptoms were 
far more likely to develop in those who had had adverse childhood experiences, 
whose developmental circumstances had left them less able to cope than their 
peers. This research suggests that the money invested into IAPT would be better 
spent on services for young people so that future generations receive greater 
protection against developing problems. To focus on the younger generation, care 
services would have to accept that there would be a limit to what they could do with 
the adult generations in the present. Seligman (2002) also recognises that although 
individuals can be encouraged to be in their best possible state of mind, there 
remains what he describes as a set range that delineates the extent of what that 
person’s responses to adversity might be.   
 
The concepts I am proposing would, in the field of emotional wellbeing, challenge the 
dominance of clinical psychology and psychiatry as the arbiters of the human mind 
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via the DSM. While categorisation is helpful in understanding the similarity between 
different forms of experience, the dominance of the DSM has devolved into 
something more suited to resolving legal disputes and inter-agency debates about 
who should take responsibility for a patient. Even if someone feels helped by being 
able to give a name to what is happening to them, it is not a name of their choosing, 
they have been told what language to use, they are a subject spoken by the system. 
They have been subjected to the medical gaze (Foucault 1994). The response to this 
power imbalance could be to place the emphasis for that person’s treatment away 
from medicine and onto reduced income inequality, improved education and more 
investment in social care during the formative years. But the treatment would also 
not follow IAPT’s utilitarianism. As Layard, an economist, has been permitted to 
grossly influence mental health policy, I see no reason why we cannot ask 
anthropologists to assess the state of our human population and sociologists or 
cultural theorists to critically appraise our mental health services. Based on 
comments by the economist Murray Rothbard, they would be far better suited: 
 
There is no objection at all to discussion of ethical concepts when they are 
needed, provided that the economist realizes always (a) that economics 
can establish no ethical principles by itself—that it can only furnish 
existential laws to the ethicist or citizen as data; and (b) that any 
importation of ethics must be grounded on a consistent, coherent set of 
ethical principles, and not simply be slipped in ad hoc in the spirit of “well, 
everyone must agree to this…”. Bland assumptions of universal 
agreement are one of the most irritating bad habits of the economist-
turned-ethicist (Rothbard 2006, p. 169; italics in the original). 
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Rather than further investment in IAPT, the funding would be diverted towards 
building a firebreak between the generations. Those who are born into disadvantage 
would have extra investment in non-psychological services such as schooling and 
social support so that the next generation does not repeat the cycle of poverty and 
lack of opportunity. Imposing the firebreak would also be to acknowledge that there 
is a limit to what psychology and psychiatry can achieve against problems rooted in 
social inequality.      
 
In recruiting from the field of psychology, IAPT ensured that the profession received 
government funding for a new generation of trainees, even though other fields - 
sociology, philosophy, anthropology, human geography, the humanities and the arts 
- have long traditions of the study of humans, their societies and their problems. This 
point becomes even more relevant if we consider the variations of the liberal, 
capitalist, democratic model of society across the globe as well as the variety of 
ways in which emotional distress can be interpreted within different sub-cultures 
within the Western cultural model.   
 
Conclusion 
I have described a type of problem and potential responses to it using McGilchrist’s 
(2009) ideas in the wider setting of Žižek’s worldview of ideology. The influences that 
McGilchrist describes are hard to detect because they occur over generations and 
appear in subtle features of culture. Žižek’s (2016, 2017) view of world events leads 
him to conclude that the impending social problems are too great for our current 
institutions to deal with in their present way. Both McGilchrist and Žižek describe 
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effects which influence the psycho-social conduct and outlook of people living within 
current technologically developed societies. In drawing on their ideas, I have also 
sought a place from which to respond to the influences they describe.     
 
Traditions that embrace non-doctrinal thinking have existed within the ideologically 
driven social structures that McGilchrist and Žižek describe and offer a form of 
response to those systems. Ideas found in doctrines that can be labelled as mystic 
or esoteric represent features that are on the margins of what is accepted or 
understood by the mainstream and with elements that escape full capture by the 
prevalent ideology. These spaces permit unusual situations to occur, the potential for 
an event (Badiou 2005) or act (Žižek 2009b) that can reset the co-ordinates of what 
went before. Such exceptional circumstances should not be artificially attempted 
(Zupancic 2011) but it may be possible for a population to be prepared for those 
moments when the surrounding social order can be changed. In the field of psycho-
social healthcare, this means that people can have an opportunity to alter the 
circumstances which have created or contributed to their distress. 
 
This invitation will not be welcomed by the current social apparatus because it places 
the emphasis for treatment on the questioning of the social structure itself and 
because it invites those within it to challenge it as part of their means of recovery. If 
one accepts the arguments put forward by McGilchrist and Žižek, the problems that 
industrialised capitalist societies face are deeply rooted within our individual and 
collective mental frameworks. Changing them will require people to relinquish 
strongly held views. Until this is possible, psycho-social care can at least create the 
conditions for change by placing the weight of investment in future generations 
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rather than attempting to resolve a swathe of social and cultural difficulties that are 
beyond the reach of the very system that is creating them. I am advocating 
interventions from a range of disciplines, ones that go beyond the treatment of 
symptoms, ones that interrogate the society that is not only permitting psycho-social 
problems but is also corrupt in the claims it makes for the alleviation of that suffering.     
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Appendix One: List of Brain Hemisphere Traits from McGilchrist (2009) 
I have included a combination of ideas about the neurological processes and the 
cultural significance of those traits along with the page reference for where the 
information can be found. In order to more easily manipulate it, I am parsing up the 
overall information provided by McGilchrist and categorising it: a left hemisphere 
function but working in harmony, when it is not giving rise to Urizen.   
The Right and Left Hemispheres Working in Harmony: 
 
The left hemisphere should return what it has processed to the right hemisphere (p. 177) which 
underwrites the work of the left (p. 197). The arrangement between them works on a veto system, it 
is permissive in that each hemisphere can say ‘no’ to what is given to it by the other (p. 197 – 198). 
Each hemisphere ‘knows’ things that the other does not because their work has to be 
compartmentalised, but only the right is in direct contact with the external world as an embodied, 
lived experience (p. 199). Despite the necessary ignorance of one another’s work, the hemispheres 
must also co-operate (p. 210). However, the right hemisphere also looks out for the left, while the 
left is concerned only with itself. 
 
Each cultural shift is a response to a sense of inauthenticity (p. 255) and develops via imitation (p. 
256) as a feedback loop between individuals and their culture as a form of Aufhebung (p. 352): 
integration. 
 
Both hemispheres can work in harmony when they develop what McGilchrist terms a “necessary 
distance” (p. 282): to step back and appreciate what has been developed. Greek culture at its best, 
with its reciprocal relationship between the citizen and the polis was an example of this (p. 282).   
The Right Hemisphere: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Left Hemisphere: 
 
p. 177 Works well at local level but has difficulty 
when it has to encompass more. 
 
p. 195 Requires clarity and fixity as these help it 
to manipulate the world. Wholeness is broken in 
to parts. Things are categorized so that they 
become familiar. 
 
p. 197 As in sculpture, the work of paring away 
things results in a certain increase. It only knows 
what the right hemisphere presents to it. 
 
p. 199 Because it deadens things in order to 
manipulate them, it tries to re-animate its world 
through novelty, excitement and stimulation. 
 
p. 209 Competitive – its main motivation is 
power. 
 
p. 218-219 The left is better at suppressing the 
right than vice versa. Although the left must 
work in concert with the right, it perceives this as 
undermining its supremacy. 
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p. 222-224 Can participate in a world of flow. 
Understands that which is implicit, intuitive, 
unattended to.  
 
p. 228 The right does not build systems. It can 
perform parallel processing of information rather 
than using a sequence. 
 
p. 234 The right appreciates the work of the left. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
p. 302 The right can accept mortality. 
 
 
p. 312 Sees the world as semi-transparent that 
hints at something more, rather than as a brute 
fact. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
p. 321 Space is experienced, lived via the body, 
articulated by personal concerns. 
 
p. 323 This list is taken from McGilchrist’s 
analysis of the Puritan movement as an 
example of a culture influenced by left 
hemisphere thinking styles.  
 
Preference for:  
ambiguous and undecided,  
multiple, fluid, moving and contingent, 
the image, 
metaphorical meaning, 
that which refers to something Other beyond, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
p. 354 Can use what the left also uses as well 
as its own preferred way. 
 
p. 222–224 The left has to have things stopped 
so that they can be analysed. Excels at over-
learned and routine behaviours. 
 
p. 228 Utilises the means of argument: 
language, logic and linearity. It builds systems 
and uses sequential processing. 
 
p. 234 It is rivalrous towards the right. 
 
p. 235 It does not take responsibility. Employs 
denial, has a tendency to conformism, a 
willingness to disregard evidence, prefers theory 
over experience. 
 
p. 254 The only value it recognises is utility.  
 
 
p. 302 Death threatens the left’s sense of 
control.  
 
 
 
 
p. 319 Seeks to eradicate what it cannot control. 
 
p. 319 Requires abstraction as this facilitates 
generalisation. 
 
 
 
p. 321 Space is symmetrical, measured and 
positioned by abstract metrics. 
 
p. 323 This list is taken from McGilchrist’s 
analysis of the Puritan movement as an 
example of a culture influenced by left 
hemisphere thinking styles.  
 
Preference for:  
clear and certain,  
single fixed, static and systematised,   
the word, 
literal meaning, 
language referring to other texts or explicit 
meanings,  
tendency towards abstraction – a downgrading 
of the physical, 
a concern with re-presentation rather than 
presentation, 
an attack on music, 
the attempt to do away with the past 
 
 
 
p. 354 The left does not have the reciprocity or 
flexibility of the right.    
 
p. 360 A rationality that demands fixity.  
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p. 360 The faculty of reason that appreciates an 
evolving nature. 
 
p. 363 Can accept that contradictory emotions 
can be generated by the same experience in the 
same moment.  
 
p. 366 Appreciation of that which is individual, 
unique, fleeting. 
 
p. 367 Sees the field of experience rather than a 
linear view. 
 
p. 369 Can accommodate partial information. 
 
p. 373 Possesses the faculty for metaphor, 
nuance and a broad, complex field of 
associations. 
 
p. 374 Utilises indirect means such as poetry. 
 
p. 374 Responds to the familiar via seeing 
things anew and from an original perspective. 
 
p. 379 The right reaches beyond itself. 
 
p. 381 Leaps of intuition – inspiration. 
 
 
 
 
p. 419 In music; consonance, harmony and 
complexity (including complex rhythms).   
 
 
p. 363 Binary experiences.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
p. 369 Insists on exactness. 
 
 
 
 
 
p. 374 Exemplifies the familiar and the 
inauthentic and responds to it with novelty. 
 
 
 
p. 379 The left is repetitious. 
 
p. 381 An unbroken line of rationality – passive. 
 
p. 408 Recombines rather than creates. 
 
 
p. 419 In music; dissonance and rhythm. 
 
Similarities between a culture dominated by the left hemisphere thinking style and subjects with a 
right hemisphere deficit or schizophrenia (p. 392 - 394):  
 
Difficulties understanding context and therefore the overall narrative of what is occurring. Difficulties 
interpreting another’s point of view. Problems with intuitive processing and understanding 
metaphor. Understanding of the flow of time replaced by units of stasis. Difficulty understanding the 
uniqueness of an event, object or person. Lack of common sense. Loss of the stabilising, 
coherence-giving, framework-building performed by the right hemisphere. Narrow focus of 
attention; particularistic, over-intellectualised and inappropriately deliberate. Reliance on piecemeal 
analysis instead of intuition, spontaneity or global apprehension. The living are regarded as 
machine-like. Everything has utility. Aspects of the self and of personal experience which need to 
remain intuitive and unconscious fall under a detached, alienating gaze – an excess of attention 
and consciousness.  
 
 
As a thought experiment, McGilchrist (2009) invites us to consider what a culture dominated by left 
hemisphere tropes would look like. Here is a brief summary of the key points (p. 428). 
 
A narrower view of the world preventing a clear understanding of the wider picture. The 
disassembled aspects of anything become more important than the whole. Increased specialisation 
would substitute information for real, experiential knowledge. Skill and judgement would be 
replaced by quantifiable and repeatable processes. Acquired expertise would be replaced by 
‘experts’ of theory and algorithmic processes. The body and art would become abstracted and the 
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world more represented than lived in. There would be an expansion of bureaucracy to justify 
procedures and to assist in manipulation of the world for its own sake. There would be greater 
inflexibility as binaries replaced matters of degree in decision-making. Consciousness would be 
dominated by thinking that aligned with technological and industrial processes. The questions 
raised by the sense of being would be relegated to a series of problems for which technology would 
find solutions. The impersonal would replace the personal, the material would be more important 
than the living. Social cohesion and a person’s sense of place would be diminished. Uniformity and 
equality would become the ultimate desirables and individuals would be made to fit artificial 
categories which would become resentful of each other. The state would take more power and 
individual responsibility would become diluted. That which would be beyond such control, such as 
death and disease, would require someone or something to be blamed. Reason would be replaced 
by rationality but there would be a reduction in common sense, which requires the hemispheres to 
work in harmony. Aggression, lateralised for the left hemisphere, would be more prevalent. There 
would be a loss of insight, unwillingness to change or take responsibility, but also unwarranted 
optimism. Individuals would see themselves as increasingly passive and suggestible, lacking self-
control and self-motivation, but not lacking the will to manipulate and acquire. Our natural sense of 
wonder would be dismissed as fantasy but it would result in a lack of meaning in life and an 
increased sense of boredom. Tacit knowledge would disappear from the wider culture and it would 
be hard for people to understand the non-explicit. The rise in explicitness would be accompanied 
by an increase in rules for each eventuality. Art would become increasingly conceptual and music 
reduced to rhythm with a loss of communal dancing. Language would become abstracted, 
managerial and lack definite meaning or the subtlety of metaphor. Nature would need to be 
managed in order to exploit it and bodies would be treated as machines. Past tradition would be 
superseded by a focus on the future.     
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Appendix Two: Terrorist Suspect Hasna Ait Boulahcen Wearing a Headscarf 
but also Making an Offensive Gesture  
Image from BBC News 21 January 2016, [online]. Available at: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-35375297. [Accessed 28 August 2016].  
Permission to reproduce this image has been granted by Shutterstock Inc. 
 
 
 
 
 
164 
 
Appendix Three: The Abraj al Bait Hotel and the Kaaba. 
The hotel which looms over the Kaaba (that site of spiritual significance appears as a 
tiny speck near the centre of the photograph) not only uses gigantism but its main 
feature is an enormous clock face. In my first project (Hanson 2014b) I described 
how power structures utilise gigantic scales in their planning. The overt 
demonstration of manipulation of the environment and the measurement of time are 
left hemisphere traits (McGilchrist 2009). 
 
Image from WAINRIGHT, O., (2012), Mecca’s Mega Architecture Casts Shadow 
Over Hajj, The Guardian, [online], [23 October 2012], available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2012/oct/23/mecca-architecture-hajj1. 
[Accessed 28 August 2016]. 
Permission to reproduce this image has been granted by Getty Images. 
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This material filled the pages of newspapers and magazines and TV 
screens, forcing out real life, it seemed to me. Over the years these 
festivities changed considerably. The first marches were probably genuine 
demonstrations of solidarity, where people who sincerely believed in the 
revolution demonstrated their trust and hope. As time passed, it became 
an obligatory ritual for everyone ... For me, demonstrations became 
something absolutely kitsch and vulgar. I understood that the 
demonstration was not a carnival but some kind of Soviet crusade. When I 
found myself in a column, I sometimes felt that I was surrounded by 
cynics, victims and fools travelling in a herd, followed – as if by policemen 
– by people wearing red ribbons. I had a feeling that the demonstration 
was a way for the regime to take people’s wish for a festival and use it for 
its own purposes. And it was important for me to discover the Party and 
Soviet components of this march. To photograph in such a way so that 
one could tell the ‘Soviet’ from the ‘human’ (Boris Mikhailov 2016). 
 
 
PROFESSIONAL DOCTORATE - DOCUMENT SIX: N0286444 
 
REFLECTIVE STUDY 
 
Introduction 
This reflective work is informed by the Vitae framework (Vitae CRAC 2011) and the 
ideas of Moon (2004). I will refer to those aspects that have an obvious match to the 
Vitae model where relevant but this document is not intended to follow a formal 
cyclical approach in the style of Gibbs (1988), by taking the lessons learned from the 
analysis and turning them into an action plan for a potential follow up piece of 
research.    
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Background to the Doctorate  
I started work in the NHS (National Health Service) in 2008, just at the time that the 
IAPT (Improving Access to Psychological Therapies) programme was starting. At 
that time I was working in a pilot study trialling a different form of psychotherapy from 
that used in IAPT so I was not within the same programme but I worked alongside its 
teams and was closely connected to its delivery in my geographic area of the NHS: 
Sandwell in the West Midlands. I was also starting a new career, having had no 
previous experience of the NHS or mental health services. I found myself able to 
question many of the accepted norms because I was an outsider who was partially 
connected with the process, witnessing the delivery of IAPT whilst not being 
indoctrinated into it. As time went on, I took on a more formalised role as a 
psychotherapist before becoming the manager of a combined mental health and 
social care team.  
 
The original area for the doctoral study was to be around the practical application of 
a spiritual tradition on emotional wellbeing. In recent years there has been research 
into the use of chaplaincy services (Mowat 2008) as an adjunct to standard mental 
health programmes. As a focus for study, healthcare chaplaincy appeared to be of 
greater relevance during this time because it was a discipline that operated within 
the health system but which represented something as far from the dogma 
underpinning IAPT as it seemed possible to get within established models of 
emotional wellbeing. During my doctoral work in Sandwell there was a further study 
into chaplaincy there (McSherry et al. 2016).  
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Before starting my doctorate, I had once been advised by a well-informed mental 
health commissioner that the Sikh community in Sandwell and West Birmingham had 
an integrated network of wellbeing services based around their religious centres. But 
I was later told by a Sikh colleague that this structure was influenced by internal 
politics, that healthcare was under the control of certain individuals linked to specific 
Gurdwaras and was not as open or as beneficial as had been assumed. This 
prompted me to reflect on the hidden ideological underside of healthcare provision in 
both mainstream and spiritual approaches to healthcare. In 2016, at the end of the 
doctoral process, there were problems within the Sikh community reported in the 
media: younger Sikhs in some areas of the United Kingdom were adopting a more 
aggressive stance in their exercise of the religion than their forebears (Taylor 2016). 
Also, in November 2016, I saw for the first time placards on display outside a large 
Gurdwara in Sandwell demanding retribution against India for the 1984 raid on the 
Sikh complex at Amritsar.   
 
In 2012, in preparation for my doctoral studies, I attended a conference organised by 
the Professional Association of Community Healthcare Chaplaincy (2012) titled 
Restoring the Human Spirit in Healthcare. The nature of that conference oriented me 
towards the idea that, rather than a new approach to mental healthcare, I was 
witnessing the expression of another ideology. Healthcare chaplaincy had initially 
appeared to be a solution to the institutionalised thinking of the NHS, but it now 
demonstrated that it too was influenced by certain ideological processes. The 
pervasiveness of ideology in healthcare delivery, however well-intentioned, became 
a focus.    
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I then had to educate myself about the nature of ideological processes and the best 
way to approach them. The properties that emerged at the meeting point of 
psychoanalytic theory and cultural studies drove the first project (Hanson 2014), 
which sought to uncover what a system said about itself without knowing that it was 
so doing. In his written work, McGilchrist’s (2009) brief mention of psychoanalysis 
relates to its clinical guise. He does not explore it in its form as cultural commentary 
or its connection to art, literature and cinema, even in those parts of The Master and 
His Emissary which could accommodate it, such as the sections on cultural 
movements. I believe that this is based on simplicity because, as with Sufism, there 
is much to recommend in the psychoanalytically inspired ideas of Lacan and Žižek 
for McGilchrist’s (2009) theory.  
 
The first project (Hanson 2014) aimed to show more clearly the nature of the 
ideological systems operating in the health and social care fields. The second one 
(Hanson 2015) sought to map a tradition that had something of the real about it, a 
spiritual tradition. I was fortunate to have built a good relationship with the local 
Yemeni Community Association for the simple reason that one of the NHS 
commissioners preferred to locate her office there so that she could be accessible to 
the local community, rather than hidden away on one of the higher floors of the office 
block where NHS management normally dwelled.  
 
My doctoral work came about through being open to a range of ideas as well as by a 
critical view of the original direction of my own planned research. I saw at a relatively 
early stage that, had I followed my original plan, I would have been reproducing the 
ideology I was already within whilst assuming that I was interrogating it. My study 
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became far more focused on ideology but I am left with the problem that, having 
apparently side-stepped one ideological trap, I will never be fully aware of the 
precise ideological points that bind me to my new position.   
 
Vitae Framework: Knowledge and Intellectual Abilities 
The first section that is listed in the Vitae framework (Vitae CRAC 2011) covers 
areas for review of knowledge and intellectual abilities. My study has taken account 
of recent changes in mental healthcare but includes a longer historical and cross-
cultural view. It has been an attempt to look beneath the monocular vision of IAPT 
and the NHS. 
 
I have not gathered quantitative data as I do not see it as the right approach for the 
problem I am dealing with, for reasons that are similar to those behind my choice of 
taking up this professional doctorate: I did not know how it would evolve and wanted 
to give myself the broadest possible scope to move across different social science 
disciplines. In choosing to do a doctorate in social practice, there is the possibility of 
going too broadly across the social science spectrum and trying to cover too many 
fields, increasing the risk that the research might not be rigorous enough. But I 
believe that my research has been “flexible and vigorous” (Vitae CRAC 2011, p. 3).  
 
My approach has been to go against the prevailing positivist conditions that 
dominate healthcare research. The current strategic direction within healthcare, and 
the economy which funds it, appears to be Urizenic and operates at an international 
level: I am up against a certain view of what constitutes an evidence base. I mistrust 
the very things that the healthcare system regards as closed to further questioning, 
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such as the overreliance on quantitative measures as a gauge by which to apportion 
expenditure, but I am interested in how these closed areas are manifestations of a 
wider ideological process. I am not only concerned with how IAPT corresponds with 
other, mutually supportive ideological structures, but also with what may be 
underpinning these institutions, with what may lie at their source. In aiming at a 
deeper level than the apparent structure of the ideological formations, it becomes 
very hard to empirically prove what I am claiming. The system I oppose only 
recognises the type of definitive proofs that are anathema to my arguments. Over the 
course of my time in the NHS, I have seen how obedience to limited types of data 
creates an agenda for many of the activities undertaken but the distortions that occur 
to meet the targets imposed by this system are unacknowledged. There are 
difficulties which are seemingly non-existent to the system although for many people 
they are the pressing reality of daily life.  
 
As a professional doctorate, my studies are situated within the working environment 
itself and not at a distance. My objectivity has been compromised in that I have 
developed a viewpoint from being within these structures, but had I not been affected 
by what I experienced then there may have been no study at all and areas requiring 
interrogation might never have been placed under effective scrutiny. I have also had 
to use fixed concepts to make things understandable and to use established 
language. I am falling under the same ideological rubric that I cited earlier (Hanson 
2014). The question would be the degree to which this undermines my work.  
 
As well as McGilchrist, I drew on the work of Žižek throughout the programme. I first 
read Žižek in 2011. It was his (Žižek 2011) commentary on the 2011 riots which first 
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helped me to think about the problem in the way that I have. Where other media 
commentators tried to interpret the events through a fairly predictable formula 
involving education, criminality and closure of public services, Žižek focused on the 
very meaninglessness of the violence itself and the importance of that absence. I 
began to see Žižek’s Lacanianism as a useful lens for interpreting events.      
 
The development of these ideas over the last four years has had non-academic 
applications for my approach to psychotherapy. Whilst a component of the 
psychotherapy treatment I deliver originates from psychology and neuroscience, 
such as an explanation of symptoms and advice on how to counter them, the 
importance of social factors in my case formulation of a patient has increased. 
Patients feel pressured by factors external to the therapy room, issues such as 
financial problems, migration status as asylum seekers, unemployment, employer 
relationships, or eligibility for benefits. In mitigating these effects, the patient’s 
capacity for appreciating ideas of value and meaning become more significant once 
the basic psychological explanations have been dispensed.    
 
External Events 
The landscape beyond my immediate research area has seen changes. The period 
of these doctoral studies coincided with the rise of Islamic State (IS), marked by its 
media presence, which had implications for my work because it demonstrated not 
only the distortions of a spiritual tradition but also something in common with art 
forms in the West when it utilised media for propaganda. The associated phenomena 
touched on different points of interest to me: the misuse of spiritual ideas, the left 
hemisphere mindset, the manipulation of art and the betrayal of an event. There was 
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a question for the Western mindset in how to engage with this new Muslim 
landscape which included; conflict in Yemen and Syria, IS-inspired attacks on the 
Charlie Hebdo offices and the Bataclan theatre in Paris as well as Brussels airport, 
the return of a small contingent of British troops to Afghanistan, the campaign 
rhetoric of President Trump relating to Islam and the migrant crisis. It has also been 
tempting for me to look at other coinciding events such as the European Union 
referendum, but with a wariness about labelling something as specifically Urizenic or 
not and the way in which doing so would simplify a more complex issue.  
 
It was hard to find a connection between my research and studies that had 
developed McGilchrist’s ideas beyond Tweedy (2012). Further exploration could then 
lead me into realms of expertise on specific topics, into works that focused on Blake 
or Lacan but did not migrate between all the areas of interest to me. Initially, post-
structuralism and Sufism seemed a strange pairing but there has been much work 
done already even at the broader level of Western philosophy and spiritual ideas 
from Asia and the Middle East. Almond (2004) sees some crossover between Sufism 
and post-structuralism but he keeps his work tightly delineated as a dialogue 
between the works of Ibn Arabi and Derrida. The discovery of Almond’s (2004) 
research came right at the end of my research and I remain blind to the potential 
work yet to be translated from Arabic or Persian which might fuse similar ideas but 
from the perspective of someone embedded in another cultural tradition exploring 
Western ideas.  
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Lack of Closure 
At the end of the thesis, my conclusion is open-ended, in keeping with Žižek and 
Lacan (Parker and Pavon-Cuellar 2014). They frustrate critics because they can be 
mercurial, presenting different ways of viewing their ideas at different stages of their 
lives. Lacan changed his way of describing his concepts over time and Žižek’s wider 
Hegelian project is a work in progress (Sharpe and Boucher 2010). My use of Lacan 
was to understand ideology much like a physicist would have used a Feynman 
diagram (Feynman 1985) to understand sub-atomic theory: to chart unseen 
processes by their visible results. The study then grew into other areas, from 
Lacanian theory as a standalone philosophy towards a practical look at liberalism 
and the eruption from the real of what was not represented: in current times the 
mass migration of a population who existed in our zones of conflict but who did not 
arrive on our shores until now.   
 
Without knowing the precise direction it would lead in, I assumed at the beginning 
that the process of formulating a thesis would have to reach a definitively closed 
conclusion. As time went on, I found myself arriving at concluding points where I 
could go no further and yet issues that I had raised during the process remained 
open. I think that this is an example of where cross-pollination with ideas from the 
law doctorate candidates has been useful, for something that appears fixed, such as 
legal definitions, requires new interpretations in new settings. This open-ended 
research style matches my attitude and I did not originally think that the two 
elements - the presumably closed certainty of research and the openness to 
alternative possibilities - would be able to match. I thought I would have had to 
conform more.  
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Inter-disciplinary Study 
Nottingham Trent University’s policy of combining the students of different fields onto 
the same taught modules provided a useful learning environment. The majority of my 
cohort peers on the taught sections of the programme were from the fields of law 
and education rather than disciplines related to health and wellbeing, but it was 
informative to learn about their areas of study because they too appeared to be 
looking at sites of tension, places where there are difficulties in the practical 
application of an ideal. From my point of view, these disciplines are also discussing 
the rules that govern a culture and the ways in which those things are transmitted: 
quilting points and ideologies. The course encouraged peer support but my preferred 
way of achieving a similar effect was by obtuse angles, abstract means and unusual 
reflective moments: activities that, according to McGilchrist (2009), combine the work 
of the two brain hemispheres. 
 
Sufic Concepts 
The development of sirr emerged while attempting to get to the foundation level of 
what constituted the human. This was based on what I was seeing daily during my 
therapy work. People would want different things from treatment and it was rarely 
clear exactly what it was they wanted, nor what it was that was changing their 
emotional condition. Once a certain element of psychology had been covered – the 
treatment of symptoms – conversations would often be based on a broader field. 
These conversations were held against the backdrop of the government’s austerity 
measures which many people in the geographic area of my practice found hard to 
cope with. Other than sirr, an alternative pathway would have been to consider 
another Islamic idea, that of jihad, which would have led from the blunt instrument of 
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jihad as conflict (lesser jihad), potentially to change social conditions, to the variant 
more in keeping with Sufism, that of greater jihad; i.e. forms of self-mastery. But self-
mastery and the psychological techniques associated with it would have remained a 
surface matter which would have had more in keeping with the cognitivist 
behaviourist school. Sirr lies beneath all of these methods and appears to get closer 
to the indefinable essence from which stems a person’s formulation of a problem and 
its response.  
 
The misuse of the Islamic concept of jihad is often utilised to show the disparity 
between deliberate distortions of Islamic ideas and their spiritual origins. As 
something acted, jihad can be observed as a form of restraint, a tool. If we focus on 
sirr then we have to consider what the tools are aiming to instill. As with the rejection 
of an overly behaviourist approach to therapy, sirr is an idea about a person’s 
interior, which may be at odds with the behaviour of the individual. The malamati (the 
way of blame) tradition of Sufism seeks to challenge the ego through inviting 
opprobrium (Toussulis 2010).  It is an inversion of the behaviourism which has 
become the standard today. I also briefly explored the concept of ruqiyah, the 
traditional Islamic practice of reciting certain Quranic verses deemed to have healing 
properties, but I found that even something so basic and available to be practiced by 
anyone could easily be utilised within a rigid framework because any behavior 
regarded as undesirable, however mild, could be framed in supernatural terms.  
 
Psychotherapy – Different Views Within the Mainstream 
The more I looked into how psychotherapy was delivered, the more it appeared that 
the specifics of technique or model were being unfairly privileged as factors worth 
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accounting for above the innate qualities of the individual clinician or patient. Asay 
and Lambert (2004) identify client factors (such as motivation and psychological 
understanding) as a key component of recovery. My research goes further to ask 
what might be at the core of such client factors, at a level deeper than standard 
metrics on client feedback which deal with rapport or congruence, for example. I also 
ask about how society and something innate to humanity combine to shape the 
formation of client factors. My research raises the question of whether what is 
necessary to a successful outcome is an absence of the Urizenic tendencies which 
would naturally restrict a patient’s self-insight and how that potential capacity within a 
person had either been cultivated or not. These ideas cannot be measured in the 
way that matters to health services currently. I am acknowledging the futility of 
fighting Urizen but recognising that there are means of escape. McGilchrist (2009) 
uses examples of cultural tropes that have rolled back Urizenic gains by Aufhebung 
– an ambiguous term incorporating ideas of, among others, integration, sublation, 
taking, cancellation. Also, the removal of a factor does not necessarily alter things. If 
any of what I discuss in the projects were to be implemented in some way, there is 
no certainty that the new approach would automatically make everything better. 
 
Personal Effectiveness 
The second segment of the Vitae framework (Vitae CRAC 2011) deals with personal 
effectiveness: the qualities and skills needed for control of professional development. 
 
Unlike those professional doctorates which have a definite career associated with 
them, such as clinical psychology, there is no specific professional role tied to a 
doctorate in social practice. The doctorate has been a method for exploring an idea 
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and for self-development rather than gaining a qualification with a specific career 
goal in mind. The best way that I can describe the process is that it allowed me to 
channel and shape my thinking on the issues that I have covered in the course of the 
programme. It provided a disciplined process of study which I needed in order to 
gain some coherence about the different ideas that I was assembling. If I later 
choose further study, I am likely to continue in that vein, to select something 
informed by the direction my interests take me at that time. Brunel University’s cross-
cultural psychology or cultural studies at The School of Oriental and African Studies 
have been two courses that may hold further routes for learning. My personal 
development during the doctorate has application in different fields: teaching, 
psychotherapy, work with other organisations, or training of clinicians from a stance 
critical of the health system. There is also scope for interdisciplinary work as I am 
responding to a pervasive trope occurring in different fields. It may be possible to 
look at moving into some form of teaching role and there is an opportunity to do so 
via a higher learning institution in India modelled along the lines of a liberal arts 
college. There is also the opportunity of providing training in a healthcare setting, 
teaching mainstream clinicians to utilise interpersonal skills to get the most from their 
encounters with their patients, the sort of work pioneered by Lieberman and Stuart 
(1999). 
 
The doctoral process has changed my approach to my NHS work. The scientific 
rigour which is promoted to workers in the health and social care professions seems 
to me to be more of an article of faith requiring belief via indoctrination. If one doubts, 
then the whole question of what constitutes an evidence base for policy falls under 
scrutiny. When I started in the NHS, I assumed that I would naturally direct my 
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further training towards psychology, which was the case for about the first three 
years. But over time, other areas grew in importance. Many of the clients entering 
therapy had problems caused by issues that fell within the domain of the social 
sciences in general. I also found that an exploration of their lives could be assisted 
by knowledge from fields such as cultural studies or anthropology, for example, in 
the way that cultural expectations shaped perceptions of normality yet were not 
themselves interrogated. This experience included areas such as emotions being 
affected by a local football team’s performance, or how a client’s perceptions and 
communication with others was influenced by media tropes, or how a fundamentally 
human process such as grieving was surrounded by ritual and opinions on what was 
deemed to be the correct way to grieve. In keeping with McGilchrist (2009), many 
clients found that others in their community or workplace were unable to understand 
the implications of an emotional difficulty for the individual undergoing it. At the start 
of the doctorate, when choosing how to articulate the problems I saw in healthcare 
and how I might respond to them, I believed that my studies would involve several 
disciplines - psychotherapy, psychology, sociology, philosophy and religion - but I 
was unsure exactly how they would be weighted and there was the added factor of 
the studies being embedded within my place of work. The professional doctorate in 
social science seemed to be the best fit for the point where these overlapped and in 
hindsight I think this assessment was justified.  
 
The research process has involved touching on subjects but then having to move on. 
There are unexplored routes that I would have liked to have spent more time on, so I 
will re-examine those areas in future. An example of this is the work of Peter 
Sloterdijk (2009) who has written about how people adapt to new environments by 
179 
 
taking a microcosm of what sustains them into the new space. I had to strike a 
balance between capturing ideas and moving forward versus exploration in greater 
depth. I cannot be certain that I have the balance right as there is no template 
representing an ideal response. I have had to excise chunks of material, each elision 
carrying with it the implications of a narrative left unextended. I eventually arrived at 
a stage where I leave what I have in the form it is now and consider what to do with 
the material and the learning. 
 
Having developed McGilchrist’s ideas in order to identify a problem in the NHS, it 
remains highly unlikely that anything can be done on an institutional level and even if 
it were, there is the possibility that the alteration of certain elements within a system 
would not actually improve things overall. In my thesis I use conceptual art under 
Serota as an example of an Urizenic tendency and, extending the analogy, I am in a 
similar position to the Stuckists (Thomson 2004) who oppose what is occurring in the 
artistic field but who are unable to influence events beyond promoting an alternative. 
From this perspective, the professional doctorate has also been a means of 
uncovering an emerging difference between myself and the healthcare institutions 
and an awareness of the limits of what might be done. 
 
The advantage of a doctorate conducted in a work setting has been the constant 
exposure to experiences of theory in practice, access to the raw material that drives 
research and an awareness of the implications of ideological processes as they 
affect people and settings. One disadvantage has been the lack of meaningful 
intellectual input at the workplace. In some ways the thesis was completed in spite of 
work rather than assisted by it. My agitation against the system has helped to 
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maintain the momentum of the thesis because I continue to see problematic 
practices around me and the institutional unwillingness to tackle them. The doctoral 
work has contributed to my decision to leave the NHS. It has allowed me to better 
assess what I observe in the workplace and what might occur in the future. It 
appears to me that structures revert easily to an Urizenic one at the earliest 
opportunity. The rhetoric of the health system sounds increasingly hollow and the 
practices within it make more sense at an institutional level when the processes are 
seen as a financial arrangement rather than primarily as a means for improving 
health and wellbeing.  
 
Engagement, Influence and Impact 
Domain D of the Vitae Framework (Vitae CRAC 2011) invites exploration of the 
effects of research. A weakness of my thesis is that the ideas in it have not been 
widely presented. I have tried to stimulate debate at a personal level in the 
workplace but the prevailing atmosphere within the NHS is too closed. I believe that 
this is partly because of pressure to prove value for money in the state sector 
through targets. For as long as the ability to meet certain targets is linked to funding, 
any discussion about the subtleties of the interpersonal relationship in wellbeing and 
the relationship between the individual and the state is viewed as a luxury. It also 
appears that the functionaries within the system do not care enough: they accept the 
current arrangements because the targets are linked to financial incentives. But I 
also think that there is a lack of enquiry within the NHS in general, without linking 
that attitude to money. People can be concerned about what is impacting on their 
working arrangements but there is not much willingness to explore more deeply the 
reasons why. This may be because the quotidian working existence leaves no room 
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for investigation or it may also be because the thinking style necessary for criticism is 
not encouraged or developed.    
 
The Possibility of Change 
If my doctorate is to help foster a new approach or a new way of seeing an issue, 
then one has to speculate on whether we will see a reaction to IAPT. I believe that in 
some quarters there is an acknowledgment about the failings of IAPT, but these 
remain undeclared because IAPT has been too great a commitment by successive 
governments. Without acknowledgement of the true nature of the problem, the 
difficulty of implementation by managers who do not really understand the extent of 
the issues remains an obstacle.  
 
In discussing the treatment of people, everyone within that closed system has to use 
the language of the institutions in order make sense.  Greater ambiguity of meaning 
within the health system would allow patients to register their experience on their 
terms, in collaboration with those treating them, so that healthcare is truly a joint 
enterprise rather than an injunction. But ambiguity is a problem when the 
benchmarks are based on financial precision weighed against an imagined view of 
how each unit has produced value for money. I have found myself differing with the 
NHS mainstream in my understanding of how data which appears precise can 
actually be telling a greater untruth than data which declares its ambiguity at the 
start. 
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The Working Process 
I found that I gained insight during occasions when I travelled, either abroad for 
several days or if I was on a long journey during a weekend; trips that were 
obligations rather than deliberately planned as routes to discovery. This is 
suggestive of pilgrimage and is in keeping with McGilchrist’s (2009) predictions 
about the mind’s reflective capacity and the ways that it can be engaged when it is 
open to a range of influences. Working within the Urizenic system of the NHS, I have 
been unable to clearly voice my ideas, so I am vulnerable to seeing only my own 
context, to be arguing from the same standpoint that I criticise. Events at my 
workplace during the period of the doctorate have been extremely challenging as 
there have been some serious matters involving key staff members and significant 
restructuring. The doctorate has provided some form of continuity through this time. 
Also, as my attitude towards my NHS work has changed, the need to remain 
embedded within the system that I have been studying has provided an incentive to 
stay within it in order to complete this process, despite the research guiding me 
towards leaving. In this way, the course has provided an opportunity to mentally 
stretch myself in an unexpected way.   
 
In order to complete the doctoral course, I needed the left hemisphere traits which I 
critically examine in the thesis. For example, I would isolate certain pieces of 
information because they carried elements of some trace idea that I was forming. 
This represents how I am part of an Urizenic process with my own blind spots, hence 
the value of the Yemeni community in the second project (Hanson 2015) in trying to 
find a reflective surface against which to measure my own set of assumptions. I 
appear to have come full circle from the starting premise formulated after attending 
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the healthcare chaplaincy conference in 2012, where the idealised view of seeing a 
potential spiritual escape route was transformed into an observation of potential 
ideological markers. For the third sub-domain of the Vitae Framework (Vitae CRAC 
2011), Engagement and Impact, my work might be seen as failed action research 
because I am admitting that the system is too strong to influence directly. It may be 
that the doctoral process has been my own Lacanian traversal of fantasy – seeing a 
structure and remaining a part of it but with a new perspective. 
 
Conclusion 
The decision to do a professional doctorate in the social sciences was the right one 
for me. My personal needs had no defined career structure within the NHS that 
necessitated a certain type of qualification beyond what I already had. The doctoral 
process allowed me to complete what I intended to gain from it: to channel my 
observations into something more coherent by researching the areas which had 
influenced my professional practice. For me, the end of the process does not present 
an immediate starting point for something new because I would prefer to spend time 
considering what to do next. In the first instance, it will be to explore the reading that 
I left behind, to revisit texts to mine them for something that I have not seen in them 
yet.     
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